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ABSTRACT
The resurgence of the far-right in European politics has been cause for alarm on a
continent which so recently suffered the consequences of the rise of fascism in the early
twentieth century. Political observers have looked on anxiously while far-right parties in Austria
and Italy have participated in the governing coalitions of those countries. In 2002, Jean Marie Le
Pen stunned the world with his advancement into the second round of the French Presidential
election. Why is the radical-right so strong right now? Why do voters cast their ballots in
support of far-right parties? In this thesis, I have examined these questions and offered some
insight into how far-right parties rose to prominence in France, Italy, Austria, and Belgium. I
hypothesize that voters who supported far-right parties in the last parliamentary elections have
less trust in both domestic and supranational political institutions, follow politics less closely, are
more likely to feel alienated, and are more likely to feel that immigrants take away jobs than
their counterparts who supported mainstream parties. My findings reveal that these hypotheses
were particularly accurate in France and Belgium, but did not correctly depict the sentiments of
Italian far-right voters. This finding suggests that far-right parties are perhaps not as similar as
some people believe, but are characterized by different goals and platforms that appeal to
different bases cross-nationally.

vi

I. INTRODUCTION
The movement to unite Europe politically and economically has been the dominant trend
in European politics in the post-war era. What began as an effort to permanently prevent war
from breaking out on the continent (European Coal and Steel Community 1951) has become an
unprecedented level of political and economic cooperation which has also coincided with a
cultural movement to unite Europe‟s disparate peoples. However, a considerable backlash has
emerged to the idea of a united Europe, and many far-right parties have taken advantage of
widespread apprehension regarding the immigration and loss of sovereignty that coincides with
European Union membership. These far-right parties have had electoral success which
culminated in their collaboration in the governments in Italy and Austria, and participation in the
second-round of the presidential elections in France. In January of 2007, with the addition of
Romania and Bulgaria into the European Union, far-right members of the European Parliament
now have satisfied a threshold that allows their caucus named Identity, Tradition, and
Sovereignty to be officially recognized and funded. What are the implications of the resurgent
far-right for European politics? Why is the far-right so strong right now?
Extreme right movements have emerged in several European countries in the last 20
years. As immigration and the signs of greater interdependence with united Europe have
increased, so too has the demand for far-right parties. In the contemporary European Union,
several member states have relevant far-right parties that play a large role in their domestic
politics; these countries include France, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria,
Bulgaria, and Romania. In addition, countries such as Sweden, Spain, the UK, Germany, and
Greece have extreme right parties that are currently just fringe movements in their respective
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domestic political systems.1 The viability of far-right parties is largely attributed to an array of
institutional characteristics and unique features of the domestic political landscape. However,
each instance of dramatic success for a far-right party is met with considerable apprehension
throughout Europe as critics of these extreme parties fear success abroad could translate to
legitimacy and success at home.

1

Norris, page 194
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II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FAR-RIGHT PARTIES
Before one can engage in a discussion of far-right parties, it is necessary to establish
exactly what a far-right party is, as many scholars indicate there is a lack of consensus about the
characteristics of far-right parties. Notable examples of labels that are not synonymous with far
right are New Right and Neoconservative. New Right is a label appropriate for subscribers of
Reaganism and Thatcherism which emphasize pro-market economic ideas, privatization, and
decreasing the role of the state in the economy. Neoconservative is a term used for
interventionist foreign policy like that of the Bush Administration which opted for a preemptive
invasion of Iraq in 2003.
In contrast, far-right parties are agreed by many scholars to be influenced primarily by
the ideology of fascism.2 Fascist ideology focuses upon an idea of creating a new revolutionary
order or new society that has nothing to do with the rotten or decadent former regime.3 Fascists
typically believe that these goals cannot be accomplished by one man, but rather it takes the
mobilization of the masses and all of the state‟s energy to pursue these reforms. Typically,
fascist movements are coalesced around one charismatic figure who seeks to create a cult of
personality. Usually this charismatic leader evokes rhetoric such as the nation emerging from a
dark period, but with the promise of brighter days ahead.4
Piero Ignazi offers what he believes are the key concepts of fascist ideology. 5
Belief in the authority of the state over the individual
An emphasis on natural community
Distrust for individual representation and parliamentary arrangements
2

Merkl, page 46
Merkl, page 48 It should be noted here that Ignazi does not group all far-right parties into the family of neofascism. He maintains that Italy‟s AN fits this description, but he views France‟s Front Nationale, Austria‟s
Freedom Party, and Belgium‟s Vlaam‟s Blok to be post-industrial far-right parties with issue positions not
reminiscent of fascism and appeals to different demographics.
4
Merkl, page 49
5
Merkl, page 49
3
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Limitations on personal and collective freedoms
Collective identification in a great national destiny
An acceptance of the hierarchical principle for social organization.
Not all scholars agree that the contemporary far right has an ideology that is reminiscent
of fascism. Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann argue that the new radical right does not
espouse the characteristics of traditional fascists and is supported by a different base. “The
fascist rhetoric was authoritarian, communitarian, and anti-capitalist, a different blend of appeals
than the new radical right.”6 In addition, Kitschelt and McGann point out that parties such as the
Austrian FPO and the French FN deny any link to fascism. Of course, these parties have
incentives to do this, as many countries ban fascist parties that subscribe to the beliefs of Hitler
and Mussolini. Furthermore, far-right parties typically incorporate terms such as “democratic”
and “progressive” into their names, when in reality they support neither of these things.7
James Gregor also believes that the term neo-fascism is commonly used recklessly by
social scientists to classify parties or movements on the right. “By the mid-1990‟s, the entry
criteria for admission into the class of neo-fascists had become increasingly slack.

Any

opposition to free immigration from anywhere and under any circumstances afforded immediate
entry-as a „racist‟ into the class of neo-fascists.”8 Gregor believes that social scientists and
politicians are too quick to pronounce certain groups or individuals to be neo-fascists and that
doing this has dramatic implications for international relations when that party gets into the
government.
Matt Golder splits far-right parties into two classifications: neo-fascist parties and
populist parties. Golder classifies parties such as the French National Front and Freedom Party
of Austria as populist because of their emphasis on materialist issues such as the connection of
6

Kitschelt, page 34
Norris, page 44
8
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7
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immigration and unemployment. He uses the 1984 slogan of Jean-Marie Le Pen to emphasize
this point; “Two million immigrants is the cause of two million Frenchmen out of work.” 9
Golder argues that in contrast, neo-fascist parties are more ideational in nature and are
characterized by an ideology that closely resembles traditional fascism across the board. Golder
maintains that it is important to make this distinction because it is the populist parties that have
enjoyed recent notable electoral successes while the neo-fascist parties have declined or have had
stable support for the last 30 years.10
Herbert Kitschelt (1997) further distinguishes between parties generally considered to be
on the far-right. Kitschelt argues extreme right parties can be classified into four different
groups: fascist parties, welfare chauvinist parties, right-authoritarian parties, and populist antistate parties. Kitschelt‟s definition of fascist parties is generally the same as the other scholars‟ I
have discussed. Kitschelt‟s right-authoritarian group is a blend of authoritarianism with promarket appeals, notably different than the fascist parties of the early to mid-twentieth century.11
Kitschelt‟s third class of welfare chauvinism typically is characterized by attempts to blame
economic problems on foreigners and immigrants. In practice, this brand of far-right politics
produces leaders who “emphasize racist or authoritarian slogans but studiously stay away from
admiration of liberal market capitalism.”12 The final party family Kitschelt discusses is the
populist anti-state parties that rail against the elite political class and big government. Kitschelt
argues that these parties are in reality libertarian in nature, and should not be grouped in with
radical- right parties.

9

Golder, page 438
Golder, page 443 *It is important to note that Golder classifies the MSI as a neo-fascist party, but fails to note its
successor Alleanza Nazionale (AN) made dramatic electoral gains in Italian politics throughout the 1990‟s (See
Appendix A)
11
Kitschelt, page 20
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It is generally agreed upon that far-right parties are quite disparate in policy preferences
and goals, and work together rather inchoately in the context of European politics. As Pippa
Norris states, “(even) parties seen as exemplifying the radical right, such as Lega Nord, the
Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (Freedom Party of Austria or FPO), and the Dansk Folkeparti,
can also be regarded as highly diverse in their ideological appeals, organizational structures, and
leadership rhetoric.”13 Nevertheless, certain commonalities and features can be observed crossnationally that justify the classification of some parties into a family of parties considered to be
on the far-right.
“Given a particular issue that is important to them, for example immigration or the rights
of asylum, a radical- right position is likely to be more hostile or punitive than those advanced by
other parties, movements, or persons.”14 Peter Merkl elaborates upon this statement by adding
that radical- right parties are prone to threaten extreme or cruel measures aimed at immigrants or
foreign-born nationals. In addition, Leonard Weinberg indicates that far-right parties typically
adopt a rhetoric that is hostile towards what they refer to as people who seek complicated
solutions to simple problems. Merkl adds that far-right parties and individuals reject the notion
of a marketplace where valid ideas are debated, instead opting to believe that there is one truth,
that which they believe.15
Far-right parties are different than traditional conservative parties in both their aims and
their practices. Far-right parties in some countries are known for using subversion tactics or
dirty tricks to achieve their goals.16 In addition, far-right movements are typically more prone to
resort to violence and other extreme manifestations of political views. Of course, violent

13
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behavior is not limited to just radical- right parties, and there are instances where the use of
excessive force has been authorized by mainstream parties, including brutal police force which
was approved and covered up by French Interior minister Charles Pasqua from the conservative
Gaullist (RPR) Party in France.17
Despite the difficulties in classifying parties as radical right and pinpointing exactly what
the ideological basis is for their collective movement, recent notable endeavors have sought to
build an academic consensus as to which parties fit into this extreme- right family. In 2000,
Marcel Lubbers sent a questionnaire to 290 political scientists in all fifteen of the EU member
states at the time as well as Norway and Switzerland. (150 of the questionnaires were
successfully completed or 52%) The political scientists were asked to place European parties on
an ideological scale of 0-10 with furthest left being “0” and furthest right being “10”. In
addition, they were asked to place parties on an immigration scale (0 being not very restrictive to
10 very restrictive) and the parties‟ past positions on immigration in 1990. There was a high
degree of inter-coder reliability, and the results were compared with a similar 1995 effort by
Hubert and Inglehart to alleviate external validity concerns. The scores of the two scales were
highly correlated (R=.99).18
When placed on a scatter gram with ideological placement on the vertical axis with
immigration attitudes on the horizontal axis, far-right parties were consistently located in the topright region. In contrast, European Green and Communist Parties typically fell into the lowerleft region. The results indicated a remarkable level of similarity between the far-right parties in
all of these countries except for Norway.19

17
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III. EUROPE’S EXTREME RIGHT PARTIES AND THEIR ELECTORAL FORTUNES
My study focuses on four similar countries that have experienced a resurgence of farright politics recently. France, Italy, Austria, and Belgium are all member states of the European
Union, and all have per capita gross domestic products that group them with the richest countries
in the world. Thus, as Ronald Inglehart would argue, each country has a substantial voting
population that is influenced by post-material concerns when deciding which party to support in
elections. Simply stated, this means that these voters have their material needs met, and thus
devote considerable attention to matters such as the environment or matters of equality.
Alexandra Cole (2005) and Paul Taggert (1996) have argued that while the left initially benefited
from this post-materialist trend most notably in regard to the advent of the Green movement, the
extreme right perhaps is the beneficiary of a backlash against this movement. While Greens
view their organization as one that supersedes state boundaries and many of their supporters
view themselves as a citizen of Europe, far-right parties and their supporters typically evoke a
spirit of nationalism. Thus, young far-right voters do not view themselves to be part of the “Egeneration” (a generational movement which identifies its members as citizens of Europe, not
nation-states) like many of their contemporaries, but rather view themselves to be French, Italian,
etc.
Each of these countries also faced a communist threat in the post-war era, especially in
Italy where the Communists could draw nearly 40% of the vote. For all of these countries,
perhaps with the exception of Belgium, the end of the Cold War began a period of political
change in the country which coincided with a period of de-alignment from the traditional
political parties. Corruption scandals in Austria and Italy may have acted as catalysts to
accelerate this de-alignment trend, and even strengthen far-right party support due to the fact that

8

these parties were not implicated in the scandals. In France, it was not widespread corruption,
but perhaps the dramatic failure and subsequent reversal of the Socialists‟ economic policy under
President Francois Mitterrand that sparked a de-alignment trend in French politics.
France
France‟s Front National (FN) has generally been one of Europe‟s leading far-right parties
since its creation in 1972. Front National was created by the leaders of Ordre nouveau, a
nationalist movement that was created in 1969 to overcome the fragmentation of France‟s
political right. The FN has based its policies primarily around the issues of immigration,
security, and unemployment.20 Led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, Front National sought to appeal to
Catholics, authoritarians, conservatives, imperialists, and racists.21
Le Pen had been the campaign manager of far-right presidential candidate TixierVignancourt in 1965. A veteran of the Algerian war, Le Pen is a charismatic figure with a
proven ability to appeal to those who are frustrated with the French government. Le Pen rejects
the idea of human equality, and blames immigrants and leftists for France‟s deteriorating
cultural, political, and economic clout.22 Le Pen and Front National have attempted to appeal to
the nationalist tradition of the French Revolution and thousands of years of history.
The FN was politically marginal for the first decade of its existence, but performed well
in the 1983 and 1984 local and European elections. It is important to note that the 1983 elections
took place in an atmosphere of widespread apprehension regarding the French economy which
was suffering extremely high rates of inflation as a result of the 1981-83 Keynesian spending of
the Socialist government led by President Francois Mitterrand. In response to the deleterious
effects of this fiscal policy, the French Socialists had to undertake a dramatic reversal of the
20

Hainsworth, page 24
Merkl, page 165
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Merkl, page 166
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nationalization and government spending that had characterized their first two years in power.
The fallout from this important event has been a notable de-alignment trend in French politics as
the convergence in fiscal policies advocated by center-right and center-left has softened the
cleavages that had characterized French politics in the post-war era.
Since the early 1980‟s, the National Front has polled between 10-15 percent of the vote in
presidential, parliamentary, regional, and European elections.23 The FN has survived several
high-profile defections in the late 1980‟s and early 1990‟s which are largely attributed to Le
Pen‟s controversial remarks regarding Jews, extreme stances, and views on the Gulf War.24
Nevertheless, the party has garnered a consistently strong vote share and Le Pen‟s status of head
of the party is unquestioned.
The pinnacle of Front National‟s success to date was the second-round participation of
Jean Marie Le Pen in the 2002 presidential elections. Crippled by the vote splitting of the left,
Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin shockingly failed to advance to the second round of the
election with incumbent President Jacques Chirac. Thus French voters in 2002 were
subsequently faced with a decision between the center-right and far-right, and international
observers were quick to condemn the election and Le Pen‟s participation. Ultimately, Jacques
Chirac was re-elected with roughly 82% of the vote.25
Jean Marie Le Pen is running for the French presidency again this year, and is currently
polling around 15% of the vote again. Political observers are generally doubtful that he will
advance to the second round again, but it is important to note that Le Pen, like most politicians

23
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on the far right, typically perform better in elections than polls reflect on account that some
voters are ashamed to admit they support him.26
Italy
The Italian far-right has also risen to prominence recently and boasts the first far-right
party to participate in the government of a Western European democracy since 1945.27 The
contemporary Italian far-right dates back all the way to 1946, just two years after fascist dictator
Benito Mussolini was overthrown. However, the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI)
garnered paltry electoral success for the first 45 years of its existence.
The Italian electoral system in the Cold War era was dominated by three parties: the
Christian Democrats (DC), the Socialists (PSI), and the Communists (PCI). Backed by the
United States politically and financially, the Christian Democrats participated in every
government from 1946-1994. The Italian Communists typically received between 25-40 percent
of the vote (mostly from Central Italy) but were always excluded from the governing coalition.
Given the relatively large threat from the Communist Party, Italian voters typically backed the
Christian Democrats or Socialists solely to keep the Communists out of power.
In the 1980‟s, Italy experienced a rapid period of economic growth and prosperity that
later would be dubbed “the Italian Miracle”. The period of economic growth even impacted the
southern region of Italy typically referred to as the Mezzogiorno, which has long lagged behind
the rest of the country in terms of modernization and economic infrastructure. As a result of this
economic growth, Italian voters may have undergone a period of de-alignment from the major
three parties that had dominated Italian politics throughout the post-war era.28 The end of the
Cold War brought on by the breakup of the Soviet Union further accelerated the de-alignment
26
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trend and Italian politics underwent a period of rapid transformation. The PCI abandoned
Marxism and reinvented itself as the Party of the Democratic Left (PDS). However, the most
important catalyst for the shakeup of the Italian political system was the series of political
scandals that came to light in the mid 1990s‟.
In 1982, Banco Ambrosiano collapsed spectacularly and suddenly largely in part to its
chairman Alberto Calvi who was involved in an illegal masonic lodge called Propaganda Due
(P2). Banco Abrosiano was established in 1896 by Giuseppe Tovini to be a Catholic-affiliated
bank that would serve moral purposes such as acquiescing charitable efforts. The Vatican indeed
has a well-documented collaboration with Banco Ambrosiano (which was often referred to as
“Priests‟ Bank”) that lasted for decades, even though the former‟s financial affairs are routinely
kept highly discrete.29 In the 1960‟s and 1970‟s, Banco Ambrosiano began to expand its scope
and it opened a holding company in Luxembourg (known for its tolerance of discrete banking
practices) in 1964. In addition, the Banco Ambrosiano, under the leadership of Calvi, created a
number of offshore companies in the Bahamas and South America. Banco Ambrosiano was
believed to be integral in funding the Contras in Nicaragua and Solidarity in Poland (which was
largely believed to be funded primarily by the Vatican Bank).
Aforementioned, Calvi was involved in the illegal masonic lodge Propaganda Due (P2).
P2, which was composed of journalists, parliamentarians, industrialists, and military leaders, was
such a prominent player in Italian politics since the 1960‟s, that it was often regarded as a state
within a state. P2 was involved in every aspect of Italian politics until the 1982 collapse of
Banco Ambrosiano.

In fact, many people believe that P2 was responsible for the death of Pope

John Paul I, who mysteriously died just 33 days into his Papal term after he had expressed
interest in reforming the Vatican‟s finances. According to CIA agent Richard Brenneke, P2 was
29

Lewin, page 1
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funded by the United States largely due to the prominent notion that P2 would state a coup in
event of the Communist Party‟s takeover of the government.
After the spectacular collapse of Banco Ambrosiano, an investigation by magistrates
revealed that hundreds of politicians had been diverting state funds to their own accounts for
personal and political use. In 1992, Socialist politician Mario Chiesa was caught red-handed
taking a bribe. Subsequently, Judge Antonio Di Pietro ordered the arrest of Chiesa, and the
ensuing trial brought to light many other instances of corruption. The magnitude and the depth
of the corruption led many to believe that the problems were systemic in nature, and the Italian
political system was mocked by millions of Italians who dubbed it Tangentopoli (Bribeville).
As a result of the ensuing Mani pulite (clean hands) campaign, the Christian Democrats‟
electoral fortunes were dramatically hampered, and the party suffered substantial losses in the
1992 elections and ultimately was ousted from the government in the 1994 elections.30
Excluded from the government since its creation in 1946, MSI was untouched by the
scandal and its surrounding upheaval. The proportional nature of the Italian electoral system
ensured that the MSI members would always account for roughly 5% of the Italian Parliament.
However the MSI (running under the name Alleanza Nazionale) dramatically improved its
electoral fortunes in the 1994 elections, when it was rewarded by an Italian electorate which had
become distrustful of the predominant political parties with 13.5% of the vote, which ultimately
became enough for inclusion in the government led by Silvio Berlusconi‟s Forza Italia. This was
the first instance of a far-right party being included in the government of any Western European
country.31

30
31
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Many scholars believe that the AN‟s success in the early 1990‟s was in part due to Silvio
Berlusconi who legitimized some of the AN‟s concerns. The main goal of Italian political
parties in the early 1990‟s was to attract voters from the center-left Socialists and center-right
Christian Democrats who were leaving their parties rapidly in response to the corruption
revealed by the Mani Pulite campaign. Berlusconi‟s Forza Italia (FI) was in many respects an
effort to prevent these centrist voters from joining ranks with the far-left Communists. Forza
Italia evoked national sentiment and pride (its English translation is “Go Italy”) in a similar
manner to Berlusconi‟s soccer franchise AC Milan. In founding Forza Italia, Berlusconi hoped
to create the first ever Italian party on the right that was sympathetic to business and bourgeoisie
interests.
Berlusconi and AN leader Gianfranco Fini agreed to run on a common platform in the
1994 elections called the Pole of Good Government.32 The Pole of Good Government produced
a common slate of FI and AN candidates in southern and central Italy. In addition, Berlusconi
struck a similar deal in northern Italy with Umberto Bossi, the head of the separatist Northern
League.33 Alleanza Nazionale is an interesting far-right party in the sense that it is relatively
sympathetic to Italians who rely on the state for financial assistance. In the 1994 election, Fini
routinely advocated big government and commitment to Italy‟s relatively poor Mezzogiorno. In
contrast, Forza Italia advocated Reagan/Thatcher economics which included tax cuts,
privatization, and a reduction of the state‟s role.34 The AN is a far-right party for its emphasis on
Italian nationalism and platform against immigration and multiculturalism.35 Whatever the

32
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differences are between Forza Italian and Alleanza Nazionale, their Pole of Good Government
was united in the notion that the left was unsuitable to govern Italy.
The AN inherited roughly 20% of the vote share of the PSI and DC, the bulk of which
joined Forza Italia. The majority of the AN‟s new-found support came from new voters. In the
1994 elections, Alleanza Nazionale (AN) performed very well amongst young voters who are far
removed from Italy‟s fascist past. Even in Northern Italy, support for AN was quite impressive.
However, the young base of the AN was not able to help to help the party in the Senate elections
(voters must be at least 25 to vote for Senators) and the AN performed considerably worse in
those contests. Nevertheless, the 1994 elections were a dramatic success for the AN, which had
tripled its vote share in central and southern Italy (going from 6.9% and 7.2% to 19.4% and
21.8% respectively). In addition, the AN doubled its vote share in Northern Italy and Tuscany
and emerged as the largest party (21.8%) in Lazio the area which includes Rome.36
The AN‟s inclusion in the government immediately became a controversial subject in
Italian and European politics. While Berlusconi reassured Europe that all the members of his
coalition were committed to democracy, 200 NAZI -saluting neo-fascist skinheads took to the
streets in Vicenza to celebrate the AN‟s inclusion into the government. In addition, Fini made
comments praising fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, further irritating critics of his inclusion in
the Italian government. Even more disturbing, the soon to be head of foreign affairs, Mirko
Tremaglia, demanded that Italy disown the Treaty of Osimo which defined Italy‟s boarders with
Yugoslavia.
The other far-right party that would ultimately participate in the government led by Silvio
Berlusconi was the Northern League (LN). Led by fiery Umberto Bossi, the Northern League is
a collection of separatist movements in Northern Italy. The industrial northern region of Italy
36
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has experienced rapid economic growth throughout the post-war era, and sympathizers of
northern succession believe that the poorer, less-developed south is an archaic burden. Bossi and
many of his supporters hope that northern Italy will someday become a sovereign state called
Padania.
Like the AN, the Northern League is somewhat of an oddity amongst far-right parties.
According to the Lubbers expert scale, the LN is located at 7.55 on the 10-point ideological scale
(1 being Communist, 10 being Nationalist) which is less extreme than Alleanza Nazionale and
many other prominent far-right parties. However, the LN‟s placement of 9 on a 10-pt immigrant
scale places them well within the far-right context.37
Unlike his AN counterpart Gianfranco Fini, Umberto Bossi is viewed to be crude and
unrefined. His politics are often compared to Austrian far-right leader Jorg Haider, who is also
very unpopular throughout Europe. Bossi has embarrassed himself several times including
instances where he claimed that the party “had a boner” and his instruction to a critic who waved
an Italian flag to protest his demonstration that she should hang that flag in a toilet. Fini and
Berlusconi worked together seamlessly in the1994 election and subsequently Fini maintained his
support for Berlusconi‟s government. In contrast, Bossi proved difficult to work with throughout
much of the 1994 campaign, and had even discredited his AN coalition partners. Scholars such
as Tom Gallagher believe the only reason Bossi‟s LN begrudgingly cooperated with Berlusconi‟s
Forza Italia was to avoid marginalization in a time period of rapid change and realignment.
The Northern League immediately benefited from Italy‟s structural adjustments
following the collapse of the First Republic in 1994. Hoping to stabilize domestic politics, the
Italians scrapped their proportional system for awarding seats in the Parliament in lieu of a
system in which 75% of the seats were awarded in first-passed-the-post elections in single37
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member districts. Prior research of political scientists such as Giovanni Sartori, Matthew Soberg
Shugart, and John Carey indicates that parties whose support is densely concentrated into a
particular region can benefit from single-member district elections because they are virtually
guaranteed to win seats in the districts in that region. Indeed the Northern Leagued did perform
very well in Northern Italy in the 1994 elections and was able to win enough seats to participate
in the government, despite the fact that the party did not even run candidates in most of Italy‟s
districts.
In December 1994, just five months after the coalition government under Berlusconi was
sworn in, the LN left the coalition and turned over power to the center-left led by Romano Prodi.
However, the Freedom Pole maintained solidarity while mitigated to the back benches, and polls
in 1995 revealed Fini to be Italy‟s most popular politician.38 The center-left Prodi government
lasted until 1996, becoming the second longest lasting Italian government in the post-war era. In
the 1996 elections, the AN improved its showing (from 13.5% in 1994 to 15.7%) and their
success ensured the return to power of the Freedom Pole coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi.
The AN has seemingly established itself as a major party in Italian politics, even as the
LN‟s viability has diminished. While offering some policies that are generally deemed to be
acceptable, the AN is still considered by many to be an unacceptable governing party. Italy has
not been punished by the EU due to the AN‟s participation in the government, but officials from
Germany, Spain, Greece, and Portugal were all concerned that the AN‟s inclusion in
Berlusconi‟s government could legitimize far-right parties in their respective countries. In
addition, Danish and Belgian ministers in the past have refused to shake hands with their
counterparts in the AN.
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Austria
The success of Austria‟s far-right party, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), has created
panic in Austria and throughout Europe about the commitment to democracy in that country.
Unlike countries such as France, Austria had not developed a liberal democratic political culture
prior to the end of World War II in 1945. In fact, the Austrians were quite skeptical of Western
European powers and other foreigners, and believed that Austria must protect its Germanic
heritage from inferior foreign people. However, in the aftermath of World War II, the Austrians
quickly recognized that they needed to cooperate with Western powers to stave off the threat of
Communism from Moscow. Included in the Marshall Plan, Austria begrudgingly accepted its
fate as being somewhat dependent upon the Western democracies.
Nevertheless, the threat of 536,000 Austrians who were members of the NAZI party was
immediately felt by the fledgling democratic regime. The Austrians were faced with a dilemma
of having to both appear eager to rapidly democratize while not permanently alienating this large
protest vote from the political establishment. Created in 1955 to integrate these former NAZIS
into mainstream politics, the FPO remained politically marginal at roughly 5% of the vote until
the 1980‟s.39 In addition, the FPO adopted more moderate policy positions and ejected
extremist elements. This transformation paid off in 1983 when the FPO joined the governing
coalition led by the Austrian Socialists.40
Despite an initially tough political landscape, the Austrians were remarkably successful at
cultivating democratic institutions and managing a growing economy. “Elite co-operation could
be held to have changed Austria from a violently divided society to a model consociational
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state.”41 Indeed, the Austrians had developed a welfare state modeled after the most generous
countries in Scandinavia, which Duncan Morrow credits for achieving social peace in Austria.
This coincided with a prominent period of consumerism and a trend of secularization in Austrian
politics.42
In the 1970‟s there were signs of a de-alignment trend in Austrian politics. The Roman
Catholic Church and the Austrian Socialists mended ties, after a generation of feud following
World War II. In addition, the media environment began to rapidly change, and Austria‟s partydominated press declined in its hegemony. In 1978, the entire Austrian political establishment
was defeated shockingly in a referendum on nuclear energy, the first sign of the Austrian
electorate‟s rebellion.43
In the 1980‟s many of Europe‟s economies, including Austria‟s, entered a period of
recession. Unemployment increased (but was still lower than Austria‟s European counterparts)
and the economic landscape proved favorable to flexible labor markets and larger farms.
Exacerbating the economic difficulties, the governing Austrian Socialists suffered political
setbacks brought on by a series of scandals in 1983. Austrians across the ideological spectrum
were unhappy with their leading political parties in the 1980‟s. The Austrian Socialists faced a
revolt from disenchanted student groups and ecologists who were sympathetic to the left. The
Austrian Christian Democratic center-right encountered anger from a fractionalized conservative
electorate including the relatively rich and educated new right, and the less skilled workers who
were vulnerable to the tumultuous economic situation.44
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In 1986, political upheaval ensued after revelations that Christian Democratic
Presidential candidate and former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kurt Waldheim had
lied about his war record. The matter was investigated by the World Jewish Congress in New
York, and immediately a taboo in Austrian politics emerged to the surface. Austria‟s war record
became a prominent topic of discussion, and the Austrian Christian Democrats debated fiercely
with the World Jewish Congress. The rhetoric of the election was such that a vote for Waldheim
was a vote for Austria and the press was saturated with anti-Semitic sentiment.
In this political climate, Jorg Haider saw his opportunity to enter the forefront of Austrian
politics. In an intra-party coup staged at the party congress in Innsbruck, Haider seized power of
the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) who at the time had been aligned with the Socialists.
Amidst overt displays of neo-Nazi celebration that shocked the mainstream political
establishment, the Austrian Socialists began to construct the policy of Ausgrenzung meaning
exclusion or putting beyond the pale.45
Haider adopted an unbridled political campaign style very similar to the Northern
League‟s Umberto Bossi. Having absolutely no responsibility in governing Austria, the FPO
was free to rail against the establishment, and their campaign themes included corruption, too
much foreign influence, the alleged arrogance of the EU, and the romantic values of the “little
man”.46 Their vote-maximizing strategy was primarily aimed at people who were losers in the
modernization Austria had undergone since the Second World War. In addition, Haider sought
to appeal to segments in the other parties that were frustrated with the general nature of partisan
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politics. In the national elections of 1986, the FPO doubled its vote share to 9.6%, despite the
defection of the entire liberal wing of the party.47
The dramatic split between the FPO and Socialists initially benefited both parties, and
their rhetoric became increasingly hostile to mobilize their respective bases. Haider however
was not content to be mitigated to a fiery opposition, and embarked upon measures to increase
his party‟s notability in Austrian politics. His FPO party lacked the organizational structure of
Austria‟s other prominent parties, but that allowed Haider significant freedom to politically
maneuver how he wanted to. “Analysis of the FPO electorate in 1986 established that Haider‟s
personality was the greatest single factor in the party‟s appeal. Voters apparently identified
Austria‟s FPO as a breath of fresh air in Austria‟s frozen political landscape.”48
Haider‟s FPO was able to replace the liberals who left the party in droves with Austria‟s
new rich and the disillusioned. To accentuate his support amongst the latter, Haider would
articulate any sort of popular resentment Austrians had towards their government. The initial
increase in support for the FPO came at the expense of Austria‟s Christian Democrats. The
subsequent elections continued this trend and the FPO reached 15% in 1990 and had a vote share
equal to that of the Christian Democrats in 1994.49 In addition, the FPO had dramatic successes
in the 1988 and 1989 provincial elections, and most surprisingly performed very well in
provinces which had long been dominated by the Socialists such as Carinthia. In the 1989
provincial elections, the FPO emerged as the second-largest party in that province and with that
showing put the Austrian policy of excluding the FPO into crisis. Anti-socialists and right-wing
Catholics who supported the Christian Democrats (who placed third in the Carinthian 1989
elections) argued that to further exclude Haider‟s FPO only created more opportunities for him to
47
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exploit the government‟s failures. Despite the fact that the Christian Democrat‟s national policy
was to exclude the FPO, the local Christian Democrats entered into a coalition with the FPO,
making Haider the governor of Carinthia.50
Haider proved to be controversial from the onset of his inclusion into political office. He
attended services for German veterans and lavished praise upon Carinthians who had resisted
Slovene encroachments in 1920. However it was his remark made in a heated economic
argument that ultimately broke the Carinthian deal with the Christian Democrats. “In the Third
Reich they had a proper employment policy, which your government in Vienna can‟t even
manage.”51
Haider quickly was saved from his own political misfire. The collapse of communism in
Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall had coincided with a spike in Eastern European
immigration into Austria. In the early 1990‟s, Haider began to adopt rhetoric that was
particularly hostile to this wave of immigrants. With slogans such as “Vienna for the Viennese”,
Haider and his radical FPO were now appealing to working-class Socialists who feared having to
compete with these immigrants for jobs. In the 1991 elections, the FPO garnered 22.5% of the
vote in Vienna, and threatened the Socialists who had dominated that city since 1945.52
Haider‟s success was accompanied by a disturbing movement amongst the Austrian
people. In the early 1990‟s there were instances of vandalism to the graves of Jewish people and
Viennese police had raided the headquarters of a far-right splinter group to find powerful
explosive weapons. Haider‟s rhetoric became increasingly emboldened as well, and he even
questioned the legitimacy of Austria‟s Second Republic, a position that even Jean Marie Le Pen
does not advocate in France. In addition, Haider argued that Austria was not truly a free country,
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but rather a state that was dominated by a group of parties that were suitable to the victorious
Allies. Haider advocated a Third Republic that abolished compulsory membership in Austria‟s
political institutions and ended Austria‟s permanent neutrality.53
By 1994, Haider‟s FPO had such a large block in the Austrian Parliament that it was
impossible for the Socialists and Christian Democrats to pass constitutional amendments without
them.54 The FPO continued to rail against the European Union, and had built a large and diverse
vote base. The FPO in the mid 1990‟s did best amongst unskilled workers (its vote share of
unskilled labor was roughly equal to that of the Socialists) and new rich. However, the FPO was
shunned by intellectuals and the university-educated middle class.
Haider‟s political successes culminated in the FPO‟s participation in the Austrian
government with the right-wing People‟s Party in 2000. This was met with widespread
condemnation in Austria and the European Union. In 2000, the other 14 EU member states
ceased normal relations with Austria, but quickly reversed that decision a few months later when
cooler heads prevailed. Haider was ultimately forced to resign in 2002, and has since split from
the FPO and formed another party which so far has garnered little success.55
Belgium
Belgium also has significant far-right parties, but their success has been rather limited
compared to France, Italy, or Austria‟s radical right movements. The French-speaking region of
Belgium has a sister party of France‟s National Front. Although the Belgian FN models their
slogans and campaigns after those of Le Pen, the party‟s peak success to date is 2.9% of vote in
the 1994 Belgian elections to the European Parliament.56

53

Hainsworth, page 55
Hainsworth, page 55
55
Norris, page 62
56
Norris, page 62
54

23

The notable radical- right party in Belgium is solely an Antwerp (located in Flanders)
phenomenon. The Vlaams Blok (VB) is a xenophobic party that was created in 1978 in a split
from the moderate People‟s Union. Vlaams Blok initially was a conglomeration of Flemish
nationalists who were devoted to the idea of Flemish succession from Belgium‟s Frenchspeaking half. However, the initial success of the party seemed to have little to do with this
cause, and could largely be attributed to Vlaams Blok‟s radical anti-immigration stances.57
In 1988, Filip Dewinter, a member of the Belgian Parliament, became the leader of the
VB faction in Antwerp. He reorganized the party into what Marc Swyngedouw calls a Stalinist
structure in which small, active groups in different neighborhoods became different specialized
branches of the party structure. By 1989, he had shifted VB‟s income sources from dues-paying
party members to state public financing.58
Dewinter adopted a flourish of rhetoric that was fiercely anti-immigrant in nature. He
argued that immigrants received special treatment from the government and that the mainstream
parties in Belgium did nothing to combat this. Given the party structure, supporters of the VB
were present whenever significant events concerning immigrants were occurring including
openings of mosques and Muslim prayer houses. Dewinter blamed problems such as crime and
decline of urban areas in Belgium on these immigrant groups and argued that they could not be
addressed until these people were deported. Vlaams Bloc essentially believes that people are not
equal, and that a hierarchy of races characterizes society. According to their hierarchy, the
Flemish are at the top of this vertically- integrated-vision of society with Dutch and Afrikaners
behind, followed by assimilated French-speaking Belgians, and in last non-European immigrants
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who don‟t speak Flemish. Analysis of the 1985 and 1987 elections revealed that Vlaams Blok
did best amongst underprivileged, urban areas in Belgian‟s Flanders region.59
However, in the 1988 municipal elections, Vlaams Blok had noticeably extended its
reach into prosperous sections of Antwerp which traditionally supported Belgium‟s Liberal
Party. This was largely attributed to an increase in urban crime, which began to be associated
with immigrants. In addition, the media began to run stories about the disheartened Antwerp
police force, many of whom were believed to be sympathetic to VB or other extreme right
movements.60
By the 1991 national elections, VB‟s proportion of the vote had risen to over 10% in
Flanders. However, the pinnacle of success for Vlaams Blok came in the 1994 municipal
elections in Antwerp where the VB drew support from all other parties to an astounding 28.5%
of the vote and 18 of the 55 seats on Antwerp‟ city council. In addition to drawing voters from
virtually every other party in Belgium, Vlaams Blok received roughly equal support from men
and women in the 1994 elections. However, the VB‟s base was overwhelmingly composed of
individuals representing the lowest level of educational attainment in Belgian society.61
Subsequent to this dramatic local success, Vlaams Blok supporters began to widen their
scope from a one-issue party focused on immigration. VB party activists railed against legalized
abortion and integration with Europe, and voiced their positions on a number of other issues as
well as their vision for society. However, the party had to maneuver carefully in order to comply
with a 1981 Belgian law that outlawed xenophobia and racism in Belgian politics. As the party
experienced electoral success, VB partisans became increasingly emboldened to speak their
minds on controversial issues. In 2002, then Vice President of the VB Roeland Raes gave an
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interview on Dutch television in which he cast doubt on the number of Jews killed in the
Holocaust and the authenticity of Anne Frank‟s Diary.62 In 2004, the Belgian Supreme Court
ruled that Vlaams Blok behaved in a matter inconsistent with the 1981 law, and ordered the party
to renounce its racism and pay a fine of 40,000 Euros. The leaders of Vlaams Blok decided to
renovate the party, and in 2004 disbanded Vlaams Blok and started Vlaams Belang (Flemish
Interest).63
The revival of far-right parties is by no means confined to the four cases I have discussed.
A recent wave of Muslim immigration to the Netherlands has prompted a movement within
Dutch society to protect Dutch culture from this influx of foreign customs. The presence of
Muslims in the Netherlands is so profound that one Dutch student I spoke with while in
Amsterdam expressed to me his argument that the Netherlands is practically a Muslim country
due to the combination of secularization amongst the native Dutch and the influx of activelypracticing Muslims. While this student in particular had no qualms about this, many other Dutch
confront this issue with a considerable amount of apprehension. In the 1970‟s the Dutch
People‟s Union (NVU) expressed these concerns and presented a platform that was very hostile
to immigrants (including placing asylum seekers into labor camps).64 However, this party was
far too radical for the Netherlands, and quickly faded into obscurity. Recently, the Center Party
(CP) and the Center Democrats (CD) have enjoyed some success in injecting far-right
viewpoints into the political discourse in the Netherlands, but have not enjoyed the successes of
some other far-right Western European parties.
The Scandinavian countries, which have extremely high tax rates and high GDP per
capita, also have a significant far-right presence. Denmark‟s Danish Progress Party stunned
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political observers with an impressive 15.9% of the vote in the 1973 Danish elections.65
Norway‟s Fremskrittpartiet received between 3.7-13% of the votes in that country throughout the
1990‟s and had a considerable amount of influence on the mainstream parties primarily on
immigration matters due to a blackmail influence.66 Even Sweden‟s far-right New Democracy
party has broken 6% of the vote and participated in the parliament before losing all their seats in
the 1994 election. Far-right parties in Scandinavia primarily focus their attention on reducing the
tax rate and minimizing the state‟s influence in the economy.67
Studies that are characterized by focus upon differences in far-right parties will likely
include discussion of Switzerland‟s extreme right led by the Swiss People‟s Party (SVP). Led by
the charismatic and outspoken Christoph Blocher, the SVP enjoyed a considerable amount of
success by capitalizing on anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiments in Swiss society. The SVP,
like the Scandinavian far-right, survives despite operating in a country with a stable democratic
tradition and affluent electorate.
The far-right‟s success disturbingly is making its way into former-Communist states in
Eastern and Central Europe. In 2007, the far-right‟s caucus in the European Parliament known
as Identity, Sovereignty, and Tradition satisfied a threshold for recognition and funding thanks to
the accession of Romania and Bulgaria into the European Union.
Michael Shafir argues that Romania‟s far-right tradition dates back to the inter-war
period and was heavily influenced by far-right movements on the Western half of the continent.
He argues that these values combined with Communism in the aftermath of World War II would
provide the basis for the Romanian version of national Communism.68 However, due to the
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dramatic difference in political development in the post-war era, it is difficult to classify Eastern
European radical right parties with their counterparts in the West. In Romania, Shafir argues
there needs to be a distinction between radical continuity parties and radical return parties.
Radical continuity parties are the inheritors of national communism, but they typically avoid
adjectives such as “socialist” in lieu of terms like “workers” or “progress”.69 Shafir argues that
these parties actively engage in efforts to deflect the blame of mistakes or problems of the past
onto other groups in the society. In Romania, these groups typically are Jews, Roma, and
Hungarians. Specifically with regard to the Jews, Romanian far-right extremists construct a
vision of Jews trying to take over the world by means of supranational institutions such as the
European Union or World Bank.70 A prominent concern in Romanian politics is that
international finance organizations will turn Romanian citizens into their slaves.71 Radical return
parties can be distinguished from the radical continuity parties primarily due to their intent to
return the political discourse to what it was in the inter-war period. Heavily influenced by the
fascism of Hitler and Mussolini, radical return parties in Romania are viewed with a considerable
degree of apprehension by political observers.
Levels of trust in political institutions in Romania are considerably lower than those in
the Western European countries in my study. The institutions that are most trusted in Romania
are the Church and the Army, both which typically espouse conservative values.
Considerable far-right movements have also formed in Poland, Bulgaria, Belarus, the
Ukraine, and Russia. In addition, Latin America, the Middle East, Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa, Canada, and the United States have all experienced movements that could be
classified into the radical right family. Pippa Norris argues that data has to be collected in all of
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these countries and scholars need to include them into their studies in order to enhance our
understanding of the similarities and differences of radical right parties throughout the world.
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IV. LITERATURE REVIEW
The recent successes of radical right parties have coincided with a plethora of scholarly
literature devoted to understanding this phenomenon. As I previously mentioned, before we can
study radical right parties, we must first have a general consensus as to what far-right parties are.
The Politics of the Extreme Right (1997) edited by Paul Hainsworth is a comprehensive
state by state analysis of far- right movements by area studies scholars who each examine one
country. The result is an informative overview of the unique political climate in each country
that either is conducive to success for radical- right parties or occlusive of their efforts to become
viable. Hainsworth‟s book offers one of the most detailed accounts of each radical right party in
Europe. The overall work is ultimately successful at dealing with each radical- right party‟s
individual success as a result of unique domestic and external factors, but does not focus its
attention on thinking of the radical right as a supranational movement.
Peter Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (1997, 2003) evoke a similar strategy of grouping
together area studies scholars‟ work regarding individual radical- right movements. Examining
the successes of the extreme right in both the 1990‟s and re-visiting the topic in the early twentyfirst century, Merkl and Weinberg offer valuable insight into the evolution of far-right
movements and the varying degrees of electoral success. Merkl and Weinberg additionally offer
a rich theoretical basis for the far-right‟s resurgence in contemporary European politics. Merkl
and Weinberg include recent waves of immigration, changing family structures, and altered
gender roles in society as possible reasons for a European political climate that is generating
support for far-right movements.
Some studies seek to trace the origins of the far-right parties that have emerged as
challengers to the mainstream parties in several prominent Western European countries in the
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last two decades. Alexandra Cole (2005) examines whether prominent radical right parties
belong in the category of new or old right. Cole‟s work is an excellent discussion of the different
meanings of left and right since the French Revolution in 1789. Cole argues that the old left
advocated notions such as liberty and equality, and the old right was a reaction against this
movement. However, Cole argues that a trend of postmodernism, as defined by Ronald
Inglehart, transformed the left into focusing on matters such as environmental movement and
eradicating racism. Thus, Cole argues that the new-right is a response to this new- left, and
many of the far-right parties such as France‟s National Front, Austria‟s FPO, and Germany‟s
Republikaner party fit the description of new- right.72
Cole‟s work was heavily influenced by a study conducted by Paul Taggert (1996).
Taggert writes:
“The wave of crisis that hit Western Europe in the 1970‟s provided the momentum for
the tides of protest that have characterized the 1980‟s and 1990‟s. This protest came first from
the left with the Green parties, the alternative politics and what was to crystallize into the New
Politics. We are only now witnessing the equivalent protest on the right. Mending together
issues of taxation, immigration and radical regionalism, across western European parties of the
right are protesting not only the polices but the politics of the old parties. This New Populism, is
in many respects, the mirror image of the New Politics (and derives) from the same deep
wellsprings of the change that have come to the crises of the postwar settlement.”73

Pia Nigge (1998) tests three popular explanations for radical right success: economic
conditions such as unemployment and inflation, dissatisfaction with the regime, and rising levels
of immigration.74 A somewhat counter-intuitive and unexpected result, Nigge found that a
declining national economy actually decreases the electoral appeal of far-right parties.
Bernt Hagtvet (1994) reaches a different conclusion in his study of right-wing extremism
in Europe. Hagtvet found that the interaction between a feeble middle class combined with
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fragmentation of parties on the traditional right promotes a political landscape that is vulnerable
to the emergence of a credible radical- right party. Hagtvet also emphasizes the severity of this
situation, as far-right politics are often associated with a variety of extremist, violent political
behavior that may target immigrants, asylum-seekers, and even the homeless or disabled.75
Aforementioned, studies such as Ignazi (1992), Kitschelt (1997), and Golder (2003) have
devoted significant attention to the question of how to classify far-right parties. Ignazi maintains
there is a difference between traditional far-right parties whose ideology is reminiscent of
fascism and contemporary far-right parties that have risen to prominence in post-industrial
societies. Ignazi includes Alleanza Nazionale into this former category, noting that from its
inception in the late 1940‟s (as the MSI) it has been characterized by nostalgia for the inter-war
fascist period. Ignazi states that these fascist parties “express anti-democratic values, are hostile
to foreigners, and search for harmony (amongst the native-born population within a given state),
and an exaltation of natural community.”76 These parties seek a rigid hierarchical structure for
society into which groups are vertically integrated. In contrast, Ignazi groups the National Front,
Freedom Party of Austria, and Vlaams Bloc into a post-industrial far-right family that espouses
an ideology that is different than inter-war fascism. He attributes this re-invented far-right to a
society where rigid class barriers no longer exist, and thus cleavages in the contemporary society
are cross-cutting making the supporters of these radical parties much more diverse than the
traditional fascist base.
Kitschelt‟s far-right parties are split into four groups: fascist, welfare chauvinist, rightauthoritarian, and populist anti-statist. Kitschelt believes contemporary fascist parties rely
heavily upon charismatic, highly-visible leaders that appeal to frustrated elements in a society.
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These fascist parties rarely have an organizational structure that resembles mainstream parties,
especially given the relatively limited number of party activists.77 Kitschelt‟s welfare chauvinist
parties are characterized by support for the welfare state, as long as it is helping native-born
citizens in need, and not “free-loading foreigners”. Welfare-chauvinist parties are somewhat
hostile to free-markets and typically espouse a desire to help the “little people”. The rightauthoritarian parties are a synthesis of liberal pro-market sentiment and authoritarian ideology.
Finally, Kitschelt‟s populist anti-statist parties are movements which rail against the established
government and elite class, but are not to be grouped in with other far-right parties.78
Golder classifies far-right parties into two categories: neo-fascist and populist. Golder
maintains that these two types of radical right parties behave differently, and have had different
degrees of success. “The problem is that populist party elites and voters may be instrumental,
whereas neo-fascist elites and voters may be expressive. It may also be the case that populist
voters are materialist, whereas neo-fascist supporters are ideational.”79 Golder argues that neofascist parties have not enjoyed a surge in recent support, while populist parties have seen
dramatic electoral gains in the last twenty years.
Van Der Brug et al. (2005) also look into this question of why some anti-immigrant
parties succeed while others fail. The 2005 study is remarkable in the sense that the author‟s
model explains 83% of the variance in support for far-right parties. Van Der Brug et al. maintain
that in order for anti-immigrant parties to be successful, citizens must evaluate their position and
generally agree with it. The implications of this finding are that parties whose vote share is
largely attributed to a protest vote phenomenon, will not sustain electoral success in the longterm. Merkl (2003) calls these protest parties‟ rapid success followed by a rapid implosion a
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flash phenomenon that is often characteristic of far-right party success. For Van Der Brug et al,
in addition to voters agreeing with the party‟s anti-immigration stances, there must be a
relatively weak threat posed by the parties on of the mainstream right. This is very reminiscent
of France in the early 1980‟s (the National Front‟s political breakthrough) when mainstream
Gaullist Prime Minister Jacques Chirac began to distance himself and his party from the extreme
anti-immigration stances of Le Pen‟s National Front. Van Der Brug‟s study also finds that the
more proportional the electoral system is, the greater the chance of a viable radical antiimmigrant party.80
Other scholars have devoted attention to the question of why the radical right is currently
so strong. Robert Jackman and Karin Volpert (1996) believe that contemporary issues such as
immigration and unemployment combined with electoral systems that foster multiple viable
parties interact to create a political environment that is conducive to radical-right successes.
Jackman and Volpert also find that policies can be implemented to reduce the threat of far-right
parties such as raising threshold requirements for representation in parliament.
Matt Golder (2003) responds to the findings of Jackman and Volpert and refutes their
arguments that proportional systems foster far-right parties and that by raising threshold
requirements governments can reduce the vote share of parties on the radical right. Golder
questions the validity of Jackman and Volpert‟s measures noting that less than 10% of their
observations fall into their category of plurality elections in single-member districts.
Furthermore, Golder‟s analysis reveals that electoral thresholds have no effect at all on the
extreme right when the effective number of parties ranges between 1.6 and 3.3 and notes that
almost 50% of the observations fall within this range.81
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Pippa Norris‟ (2005) Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market is rich in
theories regarding the far-rights recent success. Norris‟s book offers analysis of a variety of
institutional features, political trends, and unique party environment which all could influence
the level of electoral success far-right parties enjoy in their respective countries. Norris‟
important work separates theories of the radical right into supply- side and demand- side
arguments. An example of a supply- side argument is the one that is prominently argued by
political scientists such as Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann (1995). Kitschelt and
McGann have enhanced the literature with their argument that when political parties in a
particular country undergo a period of platform convergence, a party on the far-right can
experience a period of success as a reaction to this trend. According to this theory, conservatives
unhappy with their mainstream party‟s drift towards the political center will rebel at the polls and
support a far-right party closer to their proximity on the ideological continuum. This is what
Norris deems a supply-side argument in which the supply of far-right voters awaits a far-right
political party to enter the market to satisfy their political needs. Supply-side arguments in
general focus their analysis on how radical-right parties reach voters with their message.
Supply-side theories examine the leadership and programs of far-right parties and compare them
with those of the mainstream parties.82
In contrast, demand-side arguments are focused upon reactions or shocks to domestic or
external events. For example the events of September 11th, 2001 would certainly qualify as a
significant milestone that was accompanied by a dramatic shift in public opinion on foreign
policy matters in the United States. Notable scholarly work that evokes demand-side
explanations for changes in public opinion include that of Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro
(1992) in which they offer reasons for the changing public opinion throughout the post-war era
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in the United States. In regards to resurgence of far-right parties, demand-side arguments are
often focused upon prominent socioeconomic issues such as immigration and dramatic change in
policy (such as a period of greater deference to the supranational EU by the individual memberstates). In sum, demand- side accounts feature dramatic changes that are accompanied by a
period of demand for new parties to confront the impending crisis.
Other scholars focus their work on institutional features that cultivate or occlude the rise
of far-right parties to prominence in the political landscape. These works are heavily influenced
by a few classic studies that greatly enhanced our understanding of the enormous impact
democratic institutions have upon the political environment. Maurice Duverger‟s (1954) seminal
work focused upon the electoral system‟s impact on the number of viable parties a democratic
country would have. What subsequently has been dubbed “Duverger‟s Law” states that
majoritarian systems will be conducive to a two-party system where proportional systems will
result in multi viable parties. Thus, scholars such as Pippa Norris, Kai Arheimer, and Elisabeth
Carter (2006) have investigated whether majoritarian electoral systems (characterized by firstpast-the-post elections in single-member districts) can depress support for far-right parties given
the difficulties small parties have winning seats in this electoral system. Both studies
respectively found little support for the notion that majoritarian systems dissuade voters from
voting for far-right parties. Arzheimer and Carter presume perhaps that far-right voters are
impervious to the structural obstacles smaller parties face in majoritarian electoral systems.
However, another theory the authors present is that perhaps far-right voters are fundamentally
different than other voters in the sense that they do not believe in casting a compromise or
insincere vote for mainstream conservative parties just because they have a better chance of
winning.
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Recent studies have found advantages in majoritarian systems for smaller parties winning
seats in the parliament. Giovanni Sartori (1994) found that vote share that is highly concentrated
can generate victories in a number of single-member districts that have plurality elections.
Indeed, the Northern League‟s success supports this claim, winning a number of districts in
Northern Italy during their plurality voting period that was disproportionate to their total national
vote share. In fact, the Northern League did not even run candidates in most of the districts in
Central and Southern Italy.
The role federalism plays in the fortunes of radical right parties remains unclear.
Arzheimer and Carter find evidence to support their conflicting hypotheses regarding this
variable. On the one hand, federalism may benefit radical right parties as voters may be willing
to give them a chance to run a region or municipality. However, conversely voters may see
voting for a radical right party in local elections is an adequate display of a protest vote, and this
could mitigate far-right parties to influential players in local and regional politics while having
little influence as a national party.83
The role of the welfare state in determining the viability of radical right parties is also
discussed in the literature. Arend Lijphart (1968) (1984) famously argues that proportional
representation results in governments that are kinder and gentler than their majoritarian
counterparts. Lijphart contends that these governments cultivate welfare states that alleviate
many of social tensions that result in a society characterized by competing cleavages. Lijphart
also asserts that citizens who live in these countries are more satisfied with their governments
than citizens in majoritarian systems.
Dwayne Swank and Hans-George Betz (2002) examine globalization and the welfare
state‟s impact upon the success of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. Swank and
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Betz find strong correlation between decreasing amounts of factory jobs in post-industrialist
societies and an increase in support for far-right parties. However, their study cautions that it is
this shortage of factory jobs interacting with immigration that ultimately accounts for much of
the success of far-right parties. Nevertheless, the authors find that the presence of a universal
welfare state suppresses support for parties on the radical right. In addition, they find that
traditional right parties adopting some of the more mainstream positions of the radical right can
also hamper the latter‟s electoral fortunes.
Another body of literature regarding the resurgence of far-right movements focuses their
studies upon the citizens that cast their ballots for radical- right parties. A number of studies
focus their attention on whether the support for radical right parties is an ideological or protest
vote. Wouter Van Der Brug et al. (2000) find that voters who support far-right parties generally
do so for the same reasons that other voters support mainstream parties.84 However, the study
finds that in some instances, there is a considerable distance on the ideological continuum
between far-right parties and their voters, leading the authors to conclude that perhaps the French
National Front, Italy‟s Northern League, and German Republikaner Party receive a large number
of protest votes from citizens who are frustrated with the mainstream political parties.
Betz believes that the electoral success of the radical populist right can largely be
attributed to psychological factors: notably the presence of large-scale socio-economic and
structural changes. However, Betz remains somewhat quiet in the debate over whether a vote for
a radical- right party is an ideological or protest vote.
A number of studies (Norris 2005, Merkl 1997, 2003, Hainsworth 2000, Arzheimer 2006)
examine support for radical- right parties by demographics. There is a considerable degree of
consensus in the scholarly community that far-right parties receive a disproportionate amount of
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support from the petit bourgeoisie and unskilled manual labor classes. Self-employed and whitecollar professionals are particularly attracted to Kitshelt‟s radical authoritarian class of rightwing parties which emphasize pro-market solutions to problems. Kitschelt‟s work (1995) on this
issue suggest that perhaps these people who enjoy a considerable amount of autonomy in their
professions begin to develop preferences for authoritarian styles of leadership which are
commonly associated with the working class.85 Unskilled labor is attracted to anti-immigrant
parties, especially in a climate of high unemployment coupled with an influx of immigrants.
This demographic is sensitive to leaders such as Le Pen who typically point out that their jobs
are increasingly going to immigrants.
Arzheimer and Carter find a U-shaped distribution of support for radical right parties by
age, with both older and younger voters being more likely to cast their ballots for extreme right
parties than their middle-aged counterparts. In addition, their study along with many others,
finds that males exhibit a greater propensity to vote for radical right parties than females.
Arzheimer and Carter attribute their U-shaped distribution in age to weaker social integration
amongst the oldest and youngest citizens in a society. In addition, their study suggests that the
oldest and youngest citizens are more likely to be on welfare than their counterparts, and thus
may view immigrants as a threat to their state assistance.86
The social integration argument Arzheimer and Carter make resembles a prominent body
of literature initiated by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba‟s seminal 1965 study of civic
culture. Robert Putnam (1993) revisited this topic with a groundbreaking study of modern Italy
which revealed dramatic differences in social capital and trust of political institutions throughout
Italy. Putnam found that citizens living in Southern Italy, Sicily, or Sardinia (a region commonly
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referred to as the Mezzogiorno) were less likely to belong to civic organizations such as church
groups or civil societies and more likely to distrust political institutions than their counterparts in
Northern or Central Italy. In support of Alzheimer and Carter‟s argument, Southern Italy is a
stronghold for Italy‟s neo-fascist AN.
Another study on civic culture I examined was that of Warde et al. (2003) in which they
found that women were twice as likely as males to be involved in civic groups in Great Britain.
With men being more likely than women to vote for radical right parties, there is an interesting
correlation between social integration and support for radical right parties like Alzheimer and
Carter suggest.
The final body of literature I examined identifies which countries might be next to
experience success of radical right parties. Kitschelt believes that Greece, Spain, Portugal,
Germany, and Ireland all have economic and social conditions which could correspond with
electoral gains for the far-right in the future.87 Michael O‟Connell (2003) conducted a study
about the threat of radical right politics in Ireland. O‟Connell‟s book asserts that Ireland, a
traditionally homogenous country, has experienced a wave of immigration that had coincided
with an anti-immigrant backlash amongst some groups in Irish society. Disturbingly, O‟Connor
finds that the Irish people answered four questions about immigrants differently in 1997 and
2002 Eurobarometer and ISPAS surveys. Almost 60% of Irish citizens in 2002 believed that
immigrants were given preferential treatment in housing, a proportion which more than doubled
since the 1997 Eurobarometer. In addition, 70% (up from 50%) of Irish people believed that
minorities in society abused social welfare and majorities of people answered that minorities
increase unemployment and inhibit public education in 2002.88
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Nevertheless, some reports suggest that racism in Ireland may not be so rampant. In
2007, journalists lavished praise upon Dublin for acknowledging its diversity with a multicultural parade to celebrate St Patrick‟s Day. In addition, following a ban on homosexual groups
marching in New York City‟s annual parade, an openly-gay member of that city‟s council opted
to march in the Dublin parade while boycotting the festivities in his hometown.89
Germany, of course, has a history of far-right political support which culminated in
World War II. Thus, when the Repbulikaner Party which was formed largely by disgruntled
members of Bavaria‟s Christian Social Union (the sister party of Germany‟s Christian
Democratic Party) scholars immediately took notice. In 1989, the Republikaner Party had taken
over 7% of the vote in local Bavarian elections and almost 8% of the vote for the European
Parliament.90 Hans-George Betz (1990) investigated this development and found that it can be
attributed to rapid social and economic change in then West Germany. This rapid modernization
threatened a number of groups within the society and they responded by breaking away from the
traditional parties to support the far-right Republikaners.91
The literature devoted to the recent successes of radical right parties in Europe is rich in
theory and explanations for this current trend. However, as is the case with any relatively new
topic, there are still a number of holes in the literature and factors to be explained. Particularly
lacking in the literature are studies that examine differences in far-right parties throughout
Western Europe. Most of the prior work attempts to either deal with this issue as European
phenomenon or confine the focus to just one country that has experienced radical right success.
In this study, I will focus on far-right voters in four countries: France, Italy, Austria, and
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Belgium and discuss what supporters of these radical right movements have in common and
what their differences are.
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V. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
The contemporary literature regarding radical right parties is rich in theories that attempt
to explain this phenomenon. In this section, I will discuss several of the theories that are
prominently advanced by previous studies and supported by empirical evidence.
A similar trend of de-alignment in many of the countries that have experienced resurgent
radical-right parties seems to have helped facilitate their rise. These de-alignment periods were
ushered in by some type of shock which reinvigorated politics in systems that were largely
deemed to be frozen. In Italy and Austria, this was certainly the end of the Cold War, which had
curtailed certain political options in those countries. In Italy, the Christian Democrats had led
every government in the post-war era, and formed coalitions with anybody they could to keep the
Communist Party (PCI) out of the government. Thus when the Italian political system almost
simultaneously reels from an enormous scandal which implicated many Christian Democrats and
a sudden and dramatic end to communism in Europe, it is not surprising to see Italian voters
undergo a period of de-alignment and new parties emerging onto the scene. A similar situation
was the case in Austria, which found itself literally in between the democratic West and the
communist East after World War II. Like the Italian case, Austria‟s dominant Socialist Party
was implicated in a series of scandals in the early 1980‟s, and voters began to become
disenchanted with the status quo.
Italy and Austria both also experienced rapid modernization and economic gains in the
late 1970‟s and early 1980‟s. Previous work (Hainsworth, Merkl, Weinberg) suggests that these
periods of modernization weaken traditional economic cleavages resulting in what Ronald
Inglehart refers to as a post-materialization trend in society. While the left in Europe struck first
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with the advent of the Greens, the right was quick to respond with an equal and opposite
movement of its own which may be the recent successes of these radical- right parties.
In France, the weakening of socio-economic cleavages likely had a different impetus.
When Francois Mitterrand was elected to the French Presidency in 1981, he and his Socialist
allies in the French National Assembly embarked upon a campaign of nationalization, raising the
minimum wage, and providing more benefits to French workers. However, other prominent
governments (notably Thatcher‟s in the UK and Reagan‟s in the US) were reigning in
government spending at the same time, and Mitterrand‟s France soon found itself experiencing
rampant inflation as a result of the government‟s fiscal policies. In 1983, the Gaullists seized
power in the National Assembly and the French had to embark upon measures to undo the
policies of the previous government in an effort to curtail the deleterious effects of immigration.
In the wake of this, there was a perceived convergence of the mainstream left and right parties in
French politics; a condition that Pippa Norris argues is favorable to the success of far-right
parties.92
There are several prominent demand-side theories in the literature for the success of farright parties. The single-issue theory suggests that far-right parties take extreme stances on one
issue, immigration, in hopes of striking a chord with voters who are frustrated about the
mainstream parties‟ handling of that particular issue. The single-issue theory states that these
radical right parties will do their best in periods that are characterized by increasing levels of
immigration. The single-issue theory is perhaps best demonstrated in Austria, which saw a
dramatic increase in immigration from Eastern Europe in the waning years of the Cold War.
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However, the single-issue theory faces problems when confronted with the French case, as Front
National focuses on a wide-variety of issues in French politics.93
The notion that recent successes of far-right parties are largely a result of voters casting a
protest vote against the mainstream parties is another prevalent demand-side theory held by
many scholars. These theories suggest that radical-right parties have no actual ideology, but are
merely organized negative attacks against the political establishment.94
There is a fair amount of evidence that a considerable amount of the vote share radicalright parties receive is a protest vote. Recall the discussion of Austria, where local members of
the conservative Austrian OVP (Christian Democrats) in Carinthia were struggling what to do
with the growing success of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO). Many of the local OVP
members who advocated including the FPO in the regional government did so by suggesting
failure to give them some power might actually increase their future electoral success. Simply
put, if far-right parties continue to have no say in how the country is led, they can continue to
blame all of the government and society‟s shortcomings on the failures of the mainstream
parties.
Protest theories also suggest that far-right parties are “socially unstructured or
transient.”95 This means that they are prone to exhibit what is known as flash characteristics
where they quickly emerge to prominence and subsequently experience a period of rapid decline.
Italy‟s Northern League seems to fit this description, as it quickly is consolidated, participates in
the Italian government, and is mitigated to obscurity.
Some scholars suggest that a period of social breakdown is occurring and facilitating the
rise of far-right politics. These theories assert that traditional social structures such as class and
93
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religion have become less important and thus have left many individuals without a sense of
belonging in their societies. Roger Eatwell believes that young people in particular are
vulnerable in this regard while Arzheimer and Carter believe both younger and older citizens
may be prone to this type of thinking. The latter study suggests this could explain the U-shaped
distribution of support for far-right parties across the different age groups. Eatwell suggests that
these voters respond to the nationalist calls of far-right party who evoke a sense of pride in these
young people‟s heritage. Older citizens may be somewhat impervious to this nationalist tone
because many have lived through times that were characterized by unbridled nationalism
already. Warde et al. (2003) did find that both younger citizens and men were involved in less
civic organizations than older voters and females. Thus I would expect to see an inverse
relationship between participation in civic organizations and support for far-right parties.
Another prominent demand side argument for support of far-right parties is that it is a
reaction against post-materialism. The Greens in Europe rose to prominence in the 1970‟s
espousing support for protection of the environment and equality before the law. Inglehart
attributes this voting behavior to citizens living in a society where their material concerns were
met, but what about those for which this is not the case? Younger males, especially the ones
with low education and skill levels, likely do not enjoy a great degree of economic security.
When parties make the argument that globalization and immigration exacerbate economic
problems, it is not surprising that young male voters who are nervous about their financial
situation would be attracted to that party. These voters likely do not see parties such as the
Greens as being sensitive to their concerns, and will support parties that focus on the materialist
problems such as unemployment.
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This focus on economic concerns likely has accompanied the broadening of the bases
that support far-right parties. Recall my discussion of Austria in which I stated that Haider‟s
commitment to seeing jobs go to native Austrians coincided with his Freedom Party‟s success
amongst blue- collar workers in Vienna who had typically supported the Austrian socialists.
Similarly in France when Le Pen makes statements that “2 million immigrants take the jobs that
belong to 2 million Frenchmen” he is appealing to French citizens with unemployment concerns
across the ideological left-right continuum.
The most prominent supply-side theory for the success of far-right parties is an
encompassing political opportunity structure thesis.96 Pippa Norris devotes a considerable
amount of attention to one supply-side theory that focuses upon platform convergence between
the mainstream parties on the left and the right. Norris and Kitschelt believe that when these
right parties move towards the center on economic issues, they leave a void on the right which
far-right parties can capitalize on to gain support. France‟s National Front indeed had its
breakthrough in the early 1980‟s when the French public became frustrated by a wave of
immigration that the mainstream parties all ignored.
In other circumstances, the mainstream parties provide legitimacy to the far-right parties.
This was particularly the case in Italy where Silvio Berlusconi and his Forza Italia Party entered
into a coalition with the National Alliance and the Northern League despite widespread concerns
that the latter parties were not committed to the notion of representative democracy. In addition,
the Austrian OVP in Carinthia also broke with their national party‟s stance that the Freedom
Party was beyond the pale when they entered into a coalition agreement with them.
In addition, some political opportunity structure arguments focus upon the institutional
features such as electoral systems‟ role in aiding or occluding the success of radical right parties.
96

Merkl, page 58

47

Conventional wisdom suggests that radical- right parties should have more success in countries
that use proportional representation (PR) because citizens in these countries do not have the
disincentives that majoritarian voters have to forego a vote for a minor party. In PR systems,
seats in the parliament are generally allocated to reflect the national popular vote. In contrast,
majoritarian systems designed on the Westminster Model are characterized by plurality elections
in single-member districts. In the latter system, not only is there an incentive to vote for the
largest party that closely resembles the voter‟s ideology, there is also an incentive for parties to
adopt a centrist platform to attract the median voter. Thus, we should expect proportional
representation systems to have viable parties that can run on a relatively extreme platform and
voters who will support the parties that closely resemble their ideology.
Another common difference between proportional representation and majoritarian
systems is that the former typically is characterized by multi-party systems while the latter is
characterized by two-party systems.97 In multi-party systems, its is much more difficult for a
single-party to garner the seats necessary to form the government, and thus parties in those
systems are forced to enter into coalitions with other parties to achieve this task.98 Given that
parties in PR systems have less incentives to adopt centrist positions and voters have more
incentives to “vote their heart” we should expect far-right parties to do best in PR systems where
vote share is spread amongst many different parties and thus these parties have to enter coalitions
to form the government.
In Table 1, one can see that countries with higher percentages of governments that were
composed of two or more parties in the post-war era were indeed more likely to have a far-right
party with a significant level of support. This makes the policies of the mainstream conservative
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parties that concern cooperation with radical right parties even more important, as their
willingness to collaborate could lead to the participation of far-right parties in the government
which we have already seen has been the case in Italy and Austria.

Table 1: Coalition and Single-Party Governments in Western Europe (1945-2000)99
Country
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Germany
Belgium
Finland
France
Italy
Austria
Denmark
Ireland
Portugal
Sweden
Norway
Greece
Spain
Great Britain

% Coalition Governments
100
100
95
90
86
81
80
66
57
44
28
25
21
1
0
0

Type of Radical Right Party
Relevant
None
Fringe
Relevant
Fringe
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
None
None
Fringe
Relevant
Fringe
Fringe
Fringe

Another burgeoning supply-side theory on the successes of the extreme right suggests
that the media is often complicit in helping their fortunes. While the media often rails against
radical-right parties, it sometimes aids their success by positive stereotyping the native
population and issuing blame on illegal immigrants.100 The media‟s coverage of crimes
committed by illegal immigrants typically is framed in a manner in which the problem exceeds
just one isolated case, but rather belongs in a series or pattern of crimes that are cause for alarm.
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In the countries I have examined, there are specific circumstances in which media coverage
aided far-right parties in a manner that goes beyond this more subtle trend.
In Austria, revelations that led to questions about the conservative presidential candidate
Kurt Waldheim‟s war record ignited an investigation by the World Jewish Congress. In response
to this scrutiny, the media in Austria took a decidedly defensive position and much of their
coverage of the incident was characterized by blatant anti-Semitism. In Italy, far-right parties
had an even more sympathetic ally in the media, largely as a result of Silvio Berlusconi‟s media
empire that was certainly loyal to their owner and his Forza Italia party, and his political allies
Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord.
However, France‟s Front National and its leader Jean Marie Le Pen have not faired as
well in the French media. Newspapers and magazines in France and around the world largely
condemned Le Pen‟s participation in the second round of the 2002 presidential elections.
Amidst the political fallout the first round generated, “The Economist” placed Le Pen on the
cover of the reputable periodical with a heading that read “France‟s shame.” Le Pen has often
complained about what he refers to as the media‟s effort to demonize him and his supporters. In
his 2007 campaign, Le Pen has embarked upon a series of measures such as toning down his
rhetoric and placing pictures of Le Pen supporters from different races on his website in hopes of
expanding his base.
The national tradition theory is another supply-side explanation of far-right party
successes. Scholars who evoke these arguments for resurgent far-right parties argue that parties
that succeed in characterizing their movement as part of their country‟s tradition will have a
considerable amount of success at the polls. This theory is often advanced by political scholars
whose studies focus upon cultural variables to explain political trends. The national tradition
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theory also can explain the dramatic differences in support for far-right parties across similar
Western European countries. For example, a radical-right party in Germany would likely have a
difficult time experiencing success due to the country‟s history of fascism and subsequent
devastation. In the UK, a far-right party would have an even more difficult time, because their
country‟s tradition is proud for its resistance of fascist Germany to which many others
capitulated. However, in Italy, there is a tradition of fascism and a charismatic leader
(Gianfranco Fini) who proudly boasts about its proud tradition there. In contrast to Germany‟s
case in which many citizens there suffered for 45 years as a result of their country‟s defeat in the
Second World War, many Italians view their country‟s brand of fascism in a positive light that is
reminiscent of Italy‟s glorious history. In addition, historians in Italy have been more likely to
normalize rather than demonize the fascist era in that country.101
The programmatic theory suggests that radical-right parties are not simply one-issue in
nature, but are often characterized by a platform that deals with a variety of domestic and
foreign-policy issues. Implicit in the argument is that citizens who cast their ballots in favor of
these parties do so not with the intent of casting a protest vote, but rather to reward the party that
best represents their ideology and policy preferences. Realizing this, radical-right parties are
increasingly focusing their campaign on issues, not rhetoric, according to scholars who advance
this programmatic theory.
A second aspect of this argument is that radical-right parties are increasingly employing a
successful formula which combines authoritarian leadership with free-market policies.102
Scholars are typically referring to these parties as populist, suggesting they are merely
responding to prominent concerns in the electorate that other parties seem to be ignoring. In the
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Western European context, this can mean anything from an overbearing welfare state that farright parties believe the rest of the parties have all bought into, to skepticism about supranational
government.103
Finally, with regard to the programmatic theory, far-right parties often adopt rhetoric that
suggests they are neither a rightist nor a leftist party. Critics of far-right parties also suggest that
radical parties typically include terms such as “progressive” or “democratic” in their names,
while being neither of these things. Whether this is true or not, far-right parties that have a full
platform are likely to combine extreme right positions on immigration with a variety of
reasonable positions on a number of other issues in an attempt to expand their base.
The charismatic leader thesis is another prominent supply-side theory that seems to
explain radical-right success when one examines a number of different cases. This theory is
predicated on the notion that far-right parties often lack the organizational structure of the
mainstream parties, and instead have a charismatic leader who makes all the major decisions. In
every case I examined, there was a charismatic leader who seemingly single-handedly delivered
their radical-right party from political marginalization. These leaders must possess both a
considerable degree of internal charisma, which means appealing to the party loyalists, and
external charisma which means attracting new supporters.104
Roger Eatwell believes that charismatic theories, while easy to support, are difficult to
examine empirically. For starters, it is difficult to operationalize a variable such as charisma. In
addition, leaders like Umberto Bossi (Italy‟s Lega Nord) are often classified as charismatic
despite his unkempt appearance and sharp tongue, which typically do not fit most people‟s
conception of charismatic. Furthermore, leaders like Jean Marie Le Pen have experienced not
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only a considerable amount of high-level defections from the party (a lack of internal charisma)
but also face a relatively hostile majority who are put off by gaffes regarding the Holocaust (a
lack of external charisma).105
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VI. VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES
The study I am undertaking examines voters in four countries: France, Italy, Austria, and
Belgium. My study focuses upon the relationship between several independent variables and the
dependent variable of which party did each of the respondents vote for. For each country, I will
examine the relationship between trust in both domestic and supranational political institutions
and support for political parties. Building on previous literature, I hypothesize that citizens who
voted for far-right parties are less likely to trust both their country‟s parliament and the European
Parliament. I believe this will be the case as radical-right voters are often thought of as casting a
protest vote against the political establishment that they feel does not have their interests in mind.
In addition, prior research suggests that far-right voters are often relatively vulnerable
economically, and are more likely to believe both that they have to compete with immigrants for
jobs and that their country‟s economic progress has left them behind. Their frustration is often
compounded by their belief that many of the mainstream parties ignore their concerns. For these
reasons, I believe that radical-right voters will be less likely to trust their respective parliament.
Previous studies also suggest that far-right voters (or all extreme voters) are more likely to be
Euroskeptic than mainstream voters, believing that increased European integration does not have
their best interests in mind. Thus, I expect to find that in addition to not trusting their own
Parliament, far-right voters will also be less likely to trust the only democratically elected
institution of the European Union, the European Parliament.
In addition to the having less trust in the domestic and European political institutions, I
expect to find that far-right voters will be less likely to be interested in politics than voters of
their countries‟ other major parties. These variables may be related in the sense that if these
citizens do not trust the political institutions, they may be less likely to care about the political
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races to elect officers to them. However, the flip side of this could be that voters who distrust
these institutions may be very responsive to a candidate who expresses similar concerns, making
radical-right voters more likely to be engaged in political affairs.
Included in my theory section of this paper is discussion about the political opportunity
for radical-right parties to breakthrough into domestic politics. Typically present in this scenario
is a sense that the platforms of the major parties have converged leaving many voters on the
ideological continuum without a party that resembles their ideology or policy preferences. This
being said, I expect to find that voters who cast their ballots in favor of far right parties will be
less likely than their counterparts to think that politicians in general care about what people like
them think.
Finally, I will test a prominent theory which attempts to explain far-right support, the role
of immigrants in society. I expect to find that citizens who support far-right parties are more
likely to think immigrants take away jobs than those who cast votes for other parties.
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VII. DATA AND METHODS
My data source for this study is the 2002 European Social Survey which asks European
citizens a variety of societal, political, and economic questions. The relatively large scope of the
dataset is indeed an asset, and it asked respondents who they voted for in the last parliamentary
elections, which is my study‟s dependent variable. One drawback of the data source was that I
could not obtain a copy of the dataset and thus was forced to conduct my analysis on the ESS
website, which was problematic for two reasons. To begin with, I was unable to isolate far-right
voters by turning my dependent variable into a dichotomous dependent of whether of not the
respondent supported a radical-right party. Additionally, the ESS does not list the parties in an
ordered manner left to right manner, thus regression analysis could not be conducted. In lieu of
this, I have conducted Crosstab analyses to offer some insight into why voters cast their ballots
in favor of radical-right parties.
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VIII. DISCUSSION AND RESULTS
The first independent variables I will discuss is the trust in Parliament across the four
countries my study examines. In Table 2, is the level of trust citizens have in their Parliament by
political party in France. The ESS measures trust on an 11-point scale which ranges from “no
trust at all” or “0” to “complete trust” or “10”. I have condensed the 11-point scale into 3
categories: No Trust at all-3, Moderate Trust (4-6), and 7-Complete Trust. The parties included
in the table from left-right ideologically are the French Communists (PC), the French Socialists
(PS), the centrist Union for French Democracy (UDF), the right-wing Union for the Popular
Majority (UMP), and the radical-right National Front (FN).

Table 2: Trust in French Parliament by Party Vote106
No Trust-3

Moderate Trust (4-6)

7- Complete Trust

Party
PC

36.2%

52.6%

11.2%

PS

29.6%

49.7%

20.6%

UDF

9.5%

53.9%

36.5%

UMP

11.4%

57.1%

31.5%

FN

56.2%

29.2%

14.6%

106

N= 36 PC, 272PS, 52 UDF, 191 UMP, and 48 FN (Vote on First Ballot)
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Table 3: Trust in European Parliament in France by Party Vote107
No Trust-3

Moderate Trust (4-6)

7-Complete Trust

Party
PC

41.6%

47.2%

11.2%

PS

29.3%

53.0%

17.0%

UDF

23.5%

49.0%

27.4%

UMP

25.9%

55.2%

18.9%

FN

53.4%

37.8%

8.8%

As the reader can see, citizens who cast their ballot in favor of the radical-right Front
National (FN) were much more likely to distrust both the French National Assembly and the
European Parliament. Over 50% of voters who supported Front National answered that they had
almost no trust in either of these political institutions, which was a double-digit difference from
any other major French party and almost twice the rate of the centrist UDF. In France, what
these results reveal is there is a parabolic distribution for trust across the left-right ideological
continuum with both the far-left Communists and the far-right Front National voters being less
likely to trust the domestic and EU institutions than voters in the center, center-left, and centerright respectively.
The same test was performed for the Italian case with the parties being ordered from leftright starting with the Italian Communists (PCI), Italian Socialists (PSI)*108, the right-wing Forza
107

N= 36 PC, 270 PS, 51 UDF, 185 UMP, and 45 FN (Vote on First Ballot)

108

* The PSI was the former Italian Socialist party which has essentially been replaced by a coalition of Italian
Parties on the center-left that are often referred to as the Olive Tree alliance.
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Italia (FI), and two ultra-right parties Lega Nord (LN), and Alleanza Nazionale (AN).109 The
results did not conform to my hypothesis like the French case did. As is borne out by the
evidence, voters who cast their ballots in support of the Italian radical-right parties exhibited
similar, if not greater, levels of trust in both the Italian Parliament and European Parliament
when compared with voters who supported the other major Italian parties.

Table 4: Trust in Italian Parliament by Party Vote110
No Trust-3

Moderate Trust (4-6)

7-Complete Trust

Party
PCI

22.2%

66.6%

11.1%

PSI

25.5%

48.5%

26.0%

FI

22.8%

50.0%

27.0%

LN

18.2%

45.4%

36.4%

AN

16.9%

61.5%

21.6%

109

The far-right LN and AN parties are placed randomly. The reader should not infer that the AN is to the right of
the LN.
110
N= 33 PCI, 161 PSI, 170 FI, 11 LN, and 65 AN
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Table 5: Trust in European Parliament in Italy by Party Vote111
No Trust-3

Moderate Trust (4-6)

7- Complete Trust

Party
PCI

11.1%

77.7%

11.1%

PSI

7.6%

47.8%

44.1%

FI

18.2%

47.5%

30.3%

LN

18.2%

27.3%

54.5%

AN

11.3%

62.9%

25.8%

While I had predicted that all the far-right voters would indicate less trust in political
institutions than their counterparts, I suspected Italy might have a different result. The AN is a
bit of an anomaly amongst far-right parties in the sense that it has a relatively poor base that
relies heavily on governmental assistance. The AN‟s base is located primarily in southern Italy‟s
Mezzogiorno region which has long lagged behind the rest of the country in terms of economic
development. In the last 30 years, the Italian government has embarked upon considerable
measures to dramatically increase investment (and offer incentives for private companies and
individuals to do so) to decrease the gap in economic prosperity between Italy‟s poor south and
prosperous north. Robert Putnam‟s 1994 study indicated that despite this, the Italian south still
lagged far behind the north in economic prosperity, institutional performance, and trust of
political institutions. This simple test, however, could indicate perhaps trust in institutions is on
the rise since Putnam conducted his landmark study. However, given that my study does not
examine this question by region, the reader should take this observation with a grain of salt.
Indeed, Alleanza Nazionale does have considerable support in all of Italy‟s regions, and I have
111

N= 9 PCI, 159 PSI, 164 FI, 11 LN, and 62 AN
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no way of knowing the regional breakdown of the Alleanza Nazionale support in the 2002 ESS
dataset.
The results for Lega Nord are a complete surprise, given that its leader Umberto Bossi
has not only expressed complete disdain for Italy‟s Parliament, but also the idea of a unified Italy
in general. Bossi and his supporters believe that northern Italy should become a sovereign state
called Padania. The odd results can likely be attributed to the excessively small sample of Lega
Nord voters (11).
While I have attempted to attribute the relatively strong trust Alleanza Nazionale voters
have in Italy‟s Parliament to the economic assistance many voters have received from the
government, I am surprised they also have this trust for the European Parliament. This result
was highly unexpected and counter-intuitive as we generally believe that far-right parties and
their voters are somewhat skeptical of the supranational EU.
This result was most prominently seen in my results for Austria, where there was a
dramatic difference in trust for Austria‟s Parliament and trust for the European Parliament
amongst the radical Freedom Party‟s (FPO) voters. Like the previous cases, the parties are in
Austria are organized from left-right starting with the Grune (Greens), Socialists (SPO),
conservatives (OVP), and radical right (FPO).
The FPO voters revealed a similar level of trust in the Austrian Parliament compared to
the voters of the other political parties. However, FPO voters were much more likely to distrust
the European Parliament than the voters who supported the mainstream Austrian parties. The
FPO respondents indicated that they had almost no trust in the European Parliament at a rate of
61.6% which was more than double the proportion of Greens who answered the same way
(29.8%). Only 8.2% of FPO voters expressed high-complete levels of trust which was roughly
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Table 6: Trust in Austrian Parliament by Party Vote112
No Trust-3

Moderate Trust (4-6)

7-Complete Trust

Party
Grune

22.7%

44.1%

33.2%

SPO

28.2%

45.3%

26.5%

OVP

18.0%

48.7%

33.3%

FPO

33.7%

37.8%

28.5%

Table 7: Trust in European Parliament in Austria by Party Vote113
No Trust-3

Moderate Trust (4-6)

7-Complete Trust

Party
Grune

29.8%

50.4%

19.8%

SPO

41.4%

40.5%

18.1%

OVP

38.0%

46.0%

16.0%

FPO

61.6%

30.1%

8.2%

112
113

229 Grune, 482 SPO, 528 OVP, 74 FPO
222 Grune, 460 SPO, 488 OVP, 73 FPO
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half of the conservative OVP‟s proportion (the second least-trust Austrian partisans of the
EP).
This result is not surprising, and reveals the Austrian far-right‟s longstanding suspicion of
the European Union and the democratic West in general. Austria‟s radical-right indeed often
makes favorable references to Germany‟s Third Reich and many of the policies of Adolf Hitler.
Many Austrians in general have been quite suspicious of the West, and the country preferred to
be neutral throughout much of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the Austrians generally did not want
their government to succumb to the pressure of the Soviet Union, and thus joined many of the
Western institutions solely to stave off this threat from the East.
The Austrian far-right‟s contemporary opposition to the EU likely reflects their fears over
Eastern European immigration into Austria as a result of the supranational institution‟s
expansion into that region. Austria has experienced a strong wave of immigration from the east
since the termination of the Cold War, and as I discussed earlier, this has increased the FPO‟s
votes share amongst voters all over the ideological continuum as it has been the one party that
has adopted a decidedly anti-immigrant rhetoric.
The Flemish nationalist Vlaams Blok voters exhibited trust levels in both the Belgian and
European Parliaments that were far below their counterparts in six other major Belgian parties. I
thought the most striking finding in the Belgian case is how similar the trust levels were amongst
voters of the other six major parties which cross-cut Belgium‟s deep-rooted lingual divide.
Vlaams Blok sticks out as a considerable outlier with its voters exhibiting very similar low levels
of trust in their domestic and European Parliament as the voters of France‟s Front National.
Thus, the question now is how did far-right voters compare to each other in levels of trust
in domestic parliament and the supranational EP.
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Table 8: Trust in Belgian Parliament by Party Vote114
No Trust-3

Moderate Trust (4-6)

7- Complete Trust

Party
Agalev

16.7%

45.6%

37.7%

Ecolo

16.7%

53.7%

29.6%

SP

14.8%

54.8%

30.4%

PS

25.7%

53.7%

20.6%

VLD

16.4%

54.7%

28.8%

CVP

14.5%

49.4%

36.1%

VB

53.8%

41.0%

5.1%

Table 9: Trust in European Parliament in Belgium by Party Vote115
No Trust-3

Moderate Trust (4-6)

7- Complete Trust

Party
Agalev

11.9%

51.6%

36.5%

Ecolo

19.3%

49.0%

31.6%

SP

23.2%

51.2%

25.6%

PS

31.1%

55.4%

12.5%

VLD

21.8%

54.1%

24.1%

CVP

18.2%

48.6%

33.2%

VB

53.3%

38.7%

8.0%

114

90 Agalev (Flemish-speaking Greens), 54 Ecolo (French-speaking Greens), 135 SP (Flemish Socialists), 121 PS
(French Socialists), 225 VLD (Liberals), 233 CVP (Flemish Christian Democrats), and 78 VB (Flemish nationalists)
115
85 Agalev, 57 Ecolo, 125 SP, 119 PS, 216 VLD, 214 CVP, and 75 VB.
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The Flemish nationalist Vlaams Blok voters exhibited trust levels in both the Belgian and
European Parliaments that were far below their counterparts in six other major Belgian parties. I
thought the most striking finding in the Belgian case is how similar the trust levels were amongst
voters of the other six major parties which cross-cut Belgium‟s deep-rooted lingual divide.
Vlaams Blok sticks out as a considerable outlier with its voters exhibiting very similar low levels
of trust in their domestic and European Parliament as the voters of France‟s Front National.
Thus, the question now is how did far-right voters compare to each other in levels of trust
in domestic parliament and the supranational EP. Table 10 (below) and Table 11 compare levels
of trust exhibited by far-right voters cross-nationally.

Table 10: Trust in Domestic Parliament amongst Far-Right Voters
No Trust-3

Moderate Trust (4-6)

7-Complete Trust

Party
FN

56.2%

29.2%

14.6%

LN

18.2%

45.4%

36.4%

AN

16.9%

61.5%

21.6%

FPO

33.7%

37.8%

28.5%

VB

53.8%

41.0%

5.1%
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Table 11: Trust in European Parliament amongst Far-Right Voters
No Trust-3

Moderate Trust (4-6)

7-Complete Trust

FN

53.4%

37.8%

8.8%

LN

18.2%

27.3%

54.5%

AN

11.3%

62.9%

25.8%

FPO

61.6%

30.1%

8.2%

VB

53.3%

38.7%

8.0%

Party

Analysis of the crosstabs results for levels of trust in domestic and supranational political
institutions suggests a great deal of disparity amongst far-right voters across country lines. The
Italian far-right parties exhibited a high level of political trust in both the Italian and European
Parliaments which largely resembled the views expressed by supporters of the mainstream Italian
parties. The Austrian FPO exhibited a similar level of trust in the Austrian Parliament when
compared to their mainstream counterparts, but revealed a sharp difference when the focus
became the European Parliament, with the Austrian FPO voters being much less likely to trust
the EP than their mainstream counterparts. The French FN and the Belgian VB voters exhibited
a lack of trust in both their countries‟ Parliaments and the EP.
With the notable exception of Austria, far-right voters exhibited a similar level of trust in
their domestic parliament and the European Parliament. Majorities of the FN (53.4%), FPO
(61.6%), and VB (53.3) indicated that they do not trust the European Parliament; an expected
result given previous research indicates that the radical-right is typically viewed as suspicious of
supranational institutions.
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The second independent variable I examined was interest in politics of voters for each
major political party in the four countries I have examined. The ESS measures interest on a 4-pt
scale that includes the responses of “Very Interested”, “Quite Interested”, “Hardly Interested”,
and “Not Interested”. In Tables 12-16, the reader can see how each far-right party‟s voters
compared to voters of the other major parties in their respective country.
Table 12: Interest in Politics by Party in France116
Very Interested

Quite Interested

Hardly Interested

Not Interested

Party
PC

22.2%

41.7%

30.6%

5.6%

PS

16.7%

35.1%

36.9%

11.3%

UDF

9.6%

46.2%

38.4%

5.8%

UMP

15.6%

42.2%

33.9%

8.3%

FN

8.3%

20.8%

33.3%

37.5%

Table 13: Interest in Politics by Party in Italy117
Very Interested

Quite Interested

Hardly Interested

Not Interested

PCI

0

22.2%

55.6%

22.2%

PSI

17.4%

38.3%

28.1%

16.2%

FI

8.0%

32.2%

35.6%

24.1%

LN

27.3%

18.2%

45.5%

9.1%

AN

18.5%

43.1%

27.7%

10.8%

Party

116

N= 36 PC, 282 PS, 52 UDF, 192 UMP, and 48 FN.

117

N= 9 PCI, 167 PSI, 174 FI, 11 LN, and 65 AN
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Table 14: Interest in Politics by Party in Austria118
Very Interested

Quite Interested

Hardly Interested Not Interested

Grune

26.7%

50.0%

19.8%

3.4%

SPO

23.2%

39.9%

27.7%

9.2%

OVP

24.8%

42.3%

27.0%

5.9%

FPO

22.7%

46.7%

25.3%

5.3%

Party

Table 15: Interest in Politics by Party in Belgium119
Very Interested

Quite Interested

Hardly Interested

Not Interested

Party
Agalev

7.7%

50.5%

33.0%

8.8%

Ecolo

10.3%

46.6%

39.7%

3.4%

SP

11.5%

48.2%

28.8%

11.5%

PS

10.9%

28.7%

34.9%

25.6%

VLD

8.2%

50.4%

31.0%

10.3%

CVP

9.3%

38.6%

28.9%

23.2%

VB

10.3%

38.5%

24.4%

26.9%

Contrary to my expectations, voters who cast their ballots for radical-right parties did not
indicate levels of interest in politics that differed dramatically from their mainstream
counterparts in Austria or Belgium. In Italy, the relationship again was the opposite of the
118

N= 232 Grune, 491 SPO, 529 OVP, and 75 FPO
N= 91 Agalev, 58 Ecolo (Flemish and French-speaking Greens) 139 SP, 129 PS (Flemish and French-speaking
Socialists) 232 VLD (Liberals), 246 CVP (Flemish Christian Democrats) and 78 VB
119
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predicted direction, with Italian far-right AN and LN voters being more likely to say they were
interested in politics than the voters of the mainstream parties in Italian politics. The one radicalright party whose voters expressed an interest of voters that reflected what I hypothesized was
France‟s Front National. Only roughly 30% of FN voters said they were either very or quite
interested in politics while majorities in every other party in French politics indicated they were
interested or quite interested. Additionally an astounding 37.5% of FN voters indicated they had
no interest in politics, a proportion that was more than three times greater than the next leastinterested French Socialists (11.3%). Similar to the results for levels of political trust, far-right
respondents exhibited considerable differences when compared cross-nationally.

Table 16: Interest in Politics Expressed by Far-Right Voters
Very Interested

Quite Interested

Hardly Interested

Not Interested

Party
FN

8.3%

20.8%

33.3%

37.5%

LN

27.3%

18.2%

45.5%

9.1%

AN

18.5%

43.1%

27.7%

10.8%

FPO

22.7%

46.7%

25.3%

5.3%

VB

10.3%

38.5%

24.4%

26.9%

The respondents who voted for the FN and the VB expressed comparatively low interest
in politics with 37.5% and 26.9% indicating they were not interested, respectively. In addition
supporters of these parties were also least likely to indicate that they were very interested in
politics with only 8.3% and 10.3% expressing strong political interest. The AN, LN, and FPO
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were comparatively more interested, and those who voted for the Italian far-right parties actually
showed the highest level of political interest than any other bloc of voters in Italian politics.
The third independent variable my study includes is the belief in whether or not
politicians generally care about average citizens by party. As I have mentioned, previous studies
suggest that a period of mainstream party platform convergence often is followed by
considerable success of a far-right party because a substantial amount of voters are left
unrepresented by centrist ideology and policy preferences. For this reason, I have hypothesized
that far-right voters are more likely to think that politicians do not care about people like them
than other voters. In Tables 17-21, I have included the results of the crosstab tests.

Table 17: Politicians Generally Care What People Like Me Think (France) 120

Hardly Any

Very Few

Some

Most

Party
PC

19.4%

38.9%

36.1%

0

PS

23.1%

31.7%

38.4%

4.6%

UDF

11.8%

21.6%

52.9%

11.8%

UMP

10.9%

29.2%

50.0%

6.8%

FN

41.7%

35.4%

20.8%

2.1%

120

N= 36 PC, 281 PS, 51 UDF, 192 UMP, and 48 FN
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Table 18: Politicians Generally Care What People Like Me Think (Italy)121
Hardly Any

Very Few

Some

Most

Party

PCI

22.2%

55.6%

22.2%

0

PSI

23.4%

26.9%

36.5%

9.6%

FI

18.5%

37.0%

32.9%

6.4%

LN

27.2%

36.4%

36.4%

0

AN

26.6%

29.7%

32.8%

9.4%

Table 19: Politicians Generally Care What People Like Me Think (Austria)122
Hardly Any

Very Few

Some

Most

Grune

21.5%

29.8%

39.9%

6.6%

SPO

27.6%

35.2%

29.4%

6.2%

OVP

23.6%

29.5%

36.4%

9.1%

FPO

34.7%

28.0%

28.0%

6.7%

Party

121

N= 9 PCI, 167 PSI, 173 FI, 11 LN, and 64 AN

122

228 Grune, 486 SPO, 525 OVP, and 75 FPO
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Table 20: Politicians Generally Care What People Like Me Think (Belgium) 123
Hardly Any

Very Few

Some

Most

Party
Agalev

10.0%

23.3%

47.8%

16.7%

Ecolo

10.3%

29.3%

51.7%

5.2%

SP

10.1%

31.2%

45.7%

8.0%

PS

19.5%

40.6%

34.4%

3.9%

VLD

10.4%

33.8%

40.7%

9.5%

CVP

9.9%

29.6%

47.3%

8.6%

VB

30.3%

40.8%

21.1%

2.6%

Table 21: Politicians Generally Care What People Like Me Think (far-right)
Hardly Any

Very Few

Some

Most

Party
FN

41.7%

35.4%

20.8%

2.1%

LN

27.3%

36.4%

36.4%

0

AN

26.6%

29.7%

32.8%

9.4%

FPO

34.7%

28.0%

28.0%

6.7%

VB

30.3%

40.8%

21.1%

2.6%

Again in regard to the notion of whether or not politicians generally care about people
like them, the Front National voters in France and Vlaams Blok voters in Belgium responded in a
manner that was similar to each other and considerably different than the other voters in their
123

90 Agalev, 58 Ecolo, 138 SP, 128 PS, 231 VLD, 243 CVP, and 76 VB
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country. France‟s National Front voters were almost twice as likely as French Socialists (the
closest party) to answer that hardly any politicians care about what they think (41.7% to 23.1%)
The mainstream Belgian parties answered the question very similarly with large majorities
answering that very few or some politicians care about what people like them think. However a
much higher proportion of VB voters indicate that hardly any politicians care what they think,
and over 70% of the VB respondents fell into the first two categories of very few or hardly any
politician caring. In fact, a majority of respondents for every far- right party fell into these first
two categories. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that every Austrian party also had a
majority of respondents falling into these two categories, and the same can be said about the
Italian Communists who had an overwhelming 77.8% of respondents answer the question in this
manner which is a proportion which is almost 20% greater than the French Communists.
The independent variable I examined was the degree to which people who voted for a
party believed immigrants take away or create jobs in the economy. The ESS measures this
question on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (Immigrants take away jobs) to 10 (Immigrants
create new jobs). I have again collapsed the eleven ESS categories into three: 0-3 (Immigrants
take away jobs), 4-6 (immigrants probably take away and create new jobs), and 7-10 (immigrants
add new jobs). Tables 22-26 show the results for each country and for each far radical-right
party.
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Table 22: Perceived Effect Immigrants have on Jobs by Party (France)124
Take Away-3

4-6

Create New Jobs

PC

19.5%

64.0%

16.5%

PS

15.4%

54.2%

30.4%

UDF

7.6%

69.2%

23.0%

UMP

25.1%

62.2%

12.5%

FN

60.5%

35.4%

4.1%

Party

Table 23: Perceived Effect Immigrants Have on Jobs by Party (Italy)125
Take Away-3

4-6

Create New Jobs

Party
PCI

44.4%

44.4%

11.1%

PSI

26.6%

48.8%

24.6%

FI

33.5%

45.3%

20.9%

LN

54.5%

27.3%

18.2%

AN

24.6%

60.0%

15.3%

124
125

N= 36 PC, 277 PS, 52 UDF, 191 UMP, and 48 FN
N= 9 PCI, 162 PSI, 170 FI, 11 LN, and 65 AN
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Table 24: Perceived Effect Immigrants Have on Jobs by Party (Austria)126
Take Away-3

4-6

Create New Jobs

Party
Grune

11.8%

58.3%

29.9%

SPO

26.8%

58.0%

15.2%

OVP

21.2%

67.0%

11.8%

FPO

37.1%

57.1%

5.7%

Table 25: Perceived Effect of Immigrants on Jobs by Party (Belgium)127
Take Away-3

4-6

Create New Jobs

Party
Agalev

16.0%

72.4%

11.4%

Ecolo

22.3%

59.2%

22.4%

SP

18.7%

62.7%

18.6%

PS

42.4%

50.4%

7.2%

VLO

23.8%

66.4%

9.7%

CVP

28.6%

58.1%

13.2%

VB

46.6%

46.7%

6.7%

126
127

N= 221 Grune, 465 SPO, 503 OVP, and 70 FPO
87 Agalev, 54 Ecolo, 134 SP, 125 PS, 226 VLD, 234 CVP, and 75 VB
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Table 26: Perceived Effect of Immigrants on Jobs by Party (Far-Right)
Take Away-3

4-6

Create New Jobs

Party
FN

60.5%

35.4%

4.1%

LN

54.5%

27.3%

18.2%

AN

24.6%

60.0%

15.3%

FPO

37.1%

57.1%

5.7%

VB

46.6%

46.7%

6.7%

The results for the immigration question revealed that France‟s Front National voters
were the most likely of any party in the four countries I examined to believe that immigrants take
away jobs with a solid 60.5% of FN respondents expressing this belief. Evidently Le Pen‟s
rhetoric of “2 million immigrants take the jobs of 2 million Frenchmen” has gained some traction
with French voters, especially amongst those with lower skills sets who believe they are most
likely to have their job taken by an immigrant worker.
Voters who supported Vlaams Blok and the Freedom Party of Austria were also the most
likely in their respective countries to indicate that immigrants take away jobs. It should be noted
that in both cases, Socialists were the second most likely to express this belief, and in Belgium
there was only a 4% difference between French-speaking Socialists and Vlaams Blok voters who
indicated that immigrants take away jobs (46.6% to 42.4% respectively). As I mentioned earlier,
the FPO in particular was able to expand its base into Vienna‟s working class neighborhoods, a
traditional stronghold of the Austrian Socialists due to anxiety these blue-collar voters felt about
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the influx of Eastern European immigrants into Austria which coincided with the end of the Cold
War.
Alleanza Nazionale voters again did not answer as I expected. 60.0% of AN respondents
fell into the moderate category on immigration and AN voters were the least likely of the major
parties in Italian parties to indicate they believed immigration took away jobs. In contrast, the
Italian Communists, Lega Nord, and Forza Italia voters expressed concern about immigrants and
jobs at relatively high levels, despite a prominent belief that the Italian society is rapidly aging,
and thus the Italian economy will likely face a labor shortage in the near future.
The study I have undertaken tests hypotheses that relate to theories about institutional
trust and far-right voting, political interest and far-right voting, protest vote theory, and the
beliefs voters have about immigration and job security. In regard to institutional trust, France‟s
Front National and Belgium‟s Vlaams Blok voters indicated much lower levels of trust in their
countries‟ parliaments than the voters who cast their ballots in support of mainstream parties.
While indicating similar levels in trust of the Austrian Parliament as the other Austrian parties,
the FPO voters revealed a high level of distrust for the supranational European Parliament, an
expected result given the Austrian far-right‟s longstanding suspicion of the EU.
France‟s FN voters also indicated low interest in politics with 70% of Front National
voters indicating they were not or were hardly interested in political affairs. This was nearly
twice the proportion of Italian AN voters who answered the question in the same way, and the
AN and LN voters in Italy were the most likely of any Italian voters to be very or quite interested
in politics. The Austrian FPO voters indicated similar levels of interest compared with voters
who cast their ballots for mainstream parties, and the same can be said for Vlaams Blok voters in
Belgium. However, the latter (along with Belgium‟s French-speaking Socialists and Christian
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Democrats) indicated levels of disinterest in politics at a rate that was twice that of the voters for
the other parties in Belgian politics.
The only variable in my study in which every far-right party‟s voters compared to the
other voters in their respective systems in the same way was the question that asked if politicians
care what people like the respondent think. Every far-right party‟s voters were the most likely to
think that hardly any politicians care about what people like them think. The effect was biggest
in France and Belgium where 41.7% of Front National voters and 30.3% of Belgian Vlaams
Blok voters answered the question in this manner. I believe these findings offer considerable
evidence for the protest theory, which suggests far-right voters cast protest votes against parties
they believe don‟t have their interests in mind. Perhaps it is this notion that politicians don‟t care
about people that leads many of these voters to support parties that rail against the complacent
and out-of-touch government that doesn‟t represent them.
In regard to immigration, all of the far-right voters except those who cast their ballot in
favor of Alleanza Nazionale were the most likely to express the belief that immigrants take away
jobs. The effect was again strongest in France, with 60.5% of Front National voters expressing
this concern. In Austria and Belgium, the far-right voters were most likely to have this point of
view, but they were followed closely by Socialists whose blue-collar voters had similar beliefs.
This finding emphasizes the ability of far-right parties to attract voters from across the
ideological spectrum by appealing to their concerns on issues such as immigration that many of
the traditional, mainstream parties would prefer not to deal with.
Overall, I think the most important finding of my study was the amount of variance
amongst the far-right voters cross-nationally. Many people have a stereotypical sense of farright voters that they attempt to apply universally. In agreement with previous studies, I would
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suggest that these parties are indeed products of their unique political system with quite different
appeals and vote bases.
However, as far-right parties continue to participate in a significant way in politics, there
will be a demand for more studies to investigate this phenomenon. The study I have conducted
offers some insight into four countries where the radical-right has experienced a considerable
level of success, but there is room for both more in-depth studies on these cases, and especially
the cases where the far-right parties have thus far failed to be a relevant force in their country‟s
politics. In addition, the current literature can be enhanced by both elaborate case studies that
offer insight into one far-right party‟s situation and studies that examine far-right movements in a
large number of countries. The latter body of work will be particularly needed as new far-right
parties seem to be emerging in the former communist countries and Latin America.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The far-right‟s recent successes in politics have caused considerable alarm in countries
where these movements have gained traction, and abroad where opponents hope they will not.
In Austria and Italy, the far-right has already participated in the governing coalition, indicating
both a level of strength and clout which worries there domestic opponents and observers abroad.
With Bulgaria and Romania‟s recent accession into the European Union, the far-right now has a
recognized and funded caucus in Identity, Sovereignty, and Tradition which may prove to be a
difficult force to contend with inside the European Parliament.
The far-right‟s success has come at a period of transition for Europe, as it moves closer
towards uniting its eastern and western regions which were so bitterly divided in the second half
of the twentieth century. In addition, the European Union faces the difficult task of getting all its
member states to agree to a constitution which will establish the ground rules for some time to
come. In this period of rapid economic and political changes, it is clear some voters have
concerns that they feel are not being addressed by the mainstream parties, and thus are reaching
out to far-right parties in frustration. In upcoming elections in the recent future, we may gather
some insight into whether this far-right party success was a temporary phenomenon or if these
radical-right parties are around to stay.
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APPENDIX:
PARTIES AND ABBREVIATIONS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
Radical Right Parties
FN = Front National (France)
AN= Alleanza Nazionale (Italy)
LN= Lega Nord (Italy)
FPO= Freedom Party of Austria
VB = Vlaams Blok

France
PC= Communist Party
PS= Socialist Party
UDF= Union for French Democracy
UMP= Union for the Popular Movement

Italy
PCI = Communist Party
PSI= Socialist Party
FI= Forza Italia

Austria
Grune = Green
SPO = Socialists
OVP= Conservatives
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Belgium
Agalev = Flemish-speaking Greens
Ecolo= French-speaking Greens
SP= Flemish-speaking Socialists
PS= French-speaking Socialists
VLD= Flemish liberal Party
CVP= Christian Democrats (Flemish)
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